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2002 
Too often, what the process purports to secure in its formal stages can 
be subverted or diluted at its more informal stages. 1 
Since at least the 1960s, the plea bargaining rate for American criminal 
cases has been around 90%.2 Still, the fact that so many defendants prefer to 
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1. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642,644 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
2. Guilty pleas disposed of approximately 95% of all federal cases prosecuted in 1999, and 
approximately 93% in 1997 and 1998. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1999, 429 tb1.5.30 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen 
Maguire eds., 1999). Guilty pleas disposed of 91% of all felony cases prosecuted at the state level in 
1996, the most recent year for which data is available. /d. at 454 tb1.5.51. Scholars have noted the 
predominance of plea bargaining for at least three decades, with some arguing that economic necessity 
demands it. See, e.g., DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR 
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1966) (noting studies concluding that 
approximately 90% of all criminal defendants pleaded guilty); Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, 
Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REv. 887, 895 n.40 (1980) (citing 
John Kaplan, American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: Replacing the Bazaar with the 
Department Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215,220 (1977)) (noting that expenditures on the criminal justice 
system would have to double if guilty plea disposition rates were reduced to 80% of all criminal cases, 
and expenditures would triple if the figure were reduced to 70%); H. Richard Uviller, Pleading Guilty: 
A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 105 (1977) (explaining that economic 
necessity requires a plea disposition rate of 90% or higher). See also Robert E. Scott & William J. 
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) ("[Plea Bargaining) is not 
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system."). 
1 
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confess their guilt in open court rather than take their chances at trial 
continues to intrigue us. 3 Surely the predominance of plea bargaining at least 
means that it makes defendants better-off; otherwise they would not strike 
the deals.4 After all, defendants must make a choice-they cannot trade in 
their trial rights and exercise them too. Sometimes, however, they can. A few 
select rights traditionally associated with trial are so essential to protecting 
the innocent from wrongful conviction that defendants retain them even 
though they choose to plea bargain.5 In short, these so-called "trial rights" 
protect the nontrial, guilty plea defendant too. The Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is one example of such a right.6 Is Brady v. Maryland's1 duty to 
disclose yet another? 
Decided in 1963, Brady v. Maryland imposes on prosecutors a duty to 
share with defendants information· favorable to the defense and material to 
guilt or punishment.8 Under Brady and its progeny, prosecutors must disclose 
impeachment as well as exculpatory information,9 and are not excused from 
3. Scholars have long debated the merits of plea bargaining. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 
Criminal Procedure] (describing plea bargaining as a well-functioning market system that efficiently 
sets the price of crime), and Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 
1969 (1992) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining] (arguing that plea bargaining is at least as 
effective as trial in separating the guilty from the innocent), with Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme 
Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. I (1975) (maintaining that plea 
bargaining is inherently involuntary), and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 
YALE L.J. 1979 (1992) (concluding that plea bargaining should be abolished based on economic 
analysis). For a more moderate approach, see Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2 (defending plea bargaining 
using contract principles while recognizing the need for reform). 
4. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 309. 
5. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 21.6(a), at 1014-17 (3d ed. 2000) 
(discussing constitutional rights not forfeited by a guilty plea). 
6. The Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel is no less important to the guilty plea 
defendant than it is to the defendant who stands trial. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721-22 
(1948); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475 (1945). Thus, even plea bargaining defendants may 
later raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,57 (1985). The 
Court has repeatedly relied on the right to counsel as a primary means of assuring that innocents do not 
falsely plead guilty. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (identifying 
competent counsel as a safeguard against false self-condemnation); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 
258, 266-67 ( 1973) (assuming defendant's confession of guilt is accurate absent ineffective assistance 
of counsel); Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 721-22 (emphasizing counsel's role in assessing defendant's guilt 
to advise her on proper plea). See also William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 
VA. L. REv. 761, 830-31 (1989) (concluding that attorneys are provided to guilty plea defendants 
because they are necessary for factually accurate pleas). But see Alschuler, supra note 3, at 55-58 
(arguing that the Supreme Court's reliance on counsel to prevent false conviction of innocents in the 
plea bargaining context is misplaced). 
7. 373 u.s. 83 (1963). 
8. /d. at 87-88. 
9. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972). See also infra note 157 and 
accompanying text (explaining distinction between impeachment and exculpatory information). 
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nondisclosure even if they never received a request for the information10 or 
were unaware that the government had it to give. 11 At least in some ways, 
then, Brady's duty to disclose is quite broad. 12 The question is whether it is 
broad enough to protect defendants who plead guilty as well as those who 
take their chances at trial, where Brady was originally decided. Thus far, the 
Supreme Court has only considered a defendant's Brady rights in the trial 
context, 13 and has therefore never had occasion to answer this question 
(though it has recently agreed to do so). 14 Moreover, the Court's prior Brady 
decisions give no hint-even in dicta-as to. what the answer to this question 
might be. 15 That being the case, ail one can say with certainty is that the 
10. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) ("In United States v. Agurs, however, it 
became clear that a defendant's failure to request favorable evidence did not leave the [g]overnment 
free of all obligation.") (citation omitted); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (holding 
that some evidence favorable to the defense is so valuable that due process requires its disclosure even 
without a specific request). 
11. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38. 
12. In other ways, however, the duty is quite narrow. For example, Brady does not require the 
disclosure of tactical information, such as the fact that a witness has died. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 
375 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (N.Y. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978). Furthermore, Brady only 
requires the disclosure of favorable information that meets a narrow definition of materiality. See 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 699-705 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (lamenting the 
exacting nature of Brady's materiality standard in part because it permits prosecutors to withhold large 
amounts of favorable evidence with impunity). For a discussion of Brady's materiality standard in the 
trial context, see infra text accompanying notes 97-100. For a discussion of Brady's materiality 
standard in the plea bargaining context, see infra Part Ill. 
13. See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830 (2000) 
("The Supreme Court has not as yet ruled on whether a prosecutor's failure to disclose material 
exculpatory information prior to entry of a guilty plea violates the U.S. Constitution.") (footnote 
omitted). The Court's application of Brady in only the trial context is particularly notable given the 
overwhelming number of cases resolved by guilty plea since at least the 1960s. See supra note 2. 
14. See United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 803 (2002) 
(mem.). At issue in the Supreme Court's review of Ruiz are two questions: (I) whether a defendant has 
a right to Brady information before pleading guilty, and (2) if so, whether that right may be waived 
through a plea agreement. 70 U.S.L.W. 3418 (U.S. Jan 8, 2002) (No. 01-595). I address only the first 
of those questions in the analysis below, though the Supreme Court has also suggested that some rights 
are so essential to protecting the innocent that they may never be waived. See United States v. 
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 ( 1995) ("There may be some evidentiary provisions that are so 
fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding process that they may never be waived without 
irreparably 'discredit[ing] the federal courts'." (citing 21 Wright & Grakam § 5039, at 207-08)). 
Whether Brady is one of those rights is a separate question entirely, especially given the conclusions 
we can draw about defendants willing to explicitly waive theirBrady rights and plead guilty in the 
dark. See infra text accompanying notes 167-70. In any event, I make no conclusions about the 
legitimacy of Brady waivers; my only point here is that the same considerations would appear to be 
relevant in deciding both questions. For an analysis of the waiver issue, see Daniel P. Blank, Plea 
Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2011 (2000) (analyzing plea bargains that explicitly waive a defendant's Brady 
rights); Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A 
Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REv. 567 (1999) (same). 
15. John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 
50 EMORY L.J. 437,440-41 (2001). Thus far, the closest the Court has come to directly addressing the 
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Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to recognize any rights r~tained 
by defendants who plead guilty, preferring instead to protect the fina,lity of 
convictions resting on a guilty plea. 16 
Even so, providing Brady protections to those who plead guilty has 
intuitive appeal. If due process prevents prosecutors from obtaining 
convictions at trial by suppressing favorable evidence, one would think it 
would also prevent them from obtaining bargained-for convictions by doing 
the same thing. 17 Reflecting the ambiguity of the issue, state and federal 
courts across the country are split as to whether defendants who plead guilty 
can nevertheless claim Brady's protections18-and even those jurisdictions 
holding that Brady does protect the guilty plea defendant disagree as to how 
to doctrinally justify that result. 19 Given the complete lack of consensus on 
this topic and its obvious practical import, it is especially surprising that few 
topic appears to be a three-justice dissent to the denial of a writ of certiorari in Neely v. Pennsylvania, 
411 U.S. 954 ( 1973). In Neely, the defendant learned of impeachment material after his guilty plea but 
before sentencing and wished to withdraw his plea. !d. at 955-56. Dissenting Justices Douglas, 
Stewart, and Marshall agreed that the writ should have been granted, citing Brady and noting that "a 
guilty plea should not be a trap for the unwary or unwilling." !d. at 958. Unfortunately, Neely offers 
little as a predictor of the Supreme Court's current position on this issue given changes in the 
composition of the Court and the unique, pre-sentence procedural posture of the case. See id. at 957-58 
(focusing analysis on government's lack of prejudice from defendant's early withdrawal of plea). 
16. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 463-65; Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in 
the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 1020 (1989). See also Alschuler, supra note 3, at 38-
39 (explaining the rationale supporting the Supreme Court's finality doctrine). 
17. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 439. 
18. The Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all been willing to consider a 
guilty plea defendant's Brady claim on its merits. See infra Part I. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, by 
contrast, have held that a guilty plea defendant on habeas corpus review has no Brady rights, see, e.g., 
Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353,360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830 (2000); Jones v. Bryant, 
No. 00-3014, 2001 WL 1637665, at *I (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 2001), while a number of other state and 
federal courts have more generally held that Brady claims are barred by a defendant's guilty plea. See, 
e.g., Indelicato v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 2d 151, 156-58 (D. Mass. 2000); Telepo v. 
Scheidemantel, 737 F. Supp. 299, 305-06 (D.N.J. 1990); United States v. Ayala, 690 F. Supp. 1014, 
1016-17 (S.D. Fla. 1988); United States v. Wolczik, 480 F. Supp. 1205, 1210-11 (W.O. Pa. 1979); 
United States v. Autullo, Nos. 88-CR91-4, 93-C4415, 1993 WL 453446, at •2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1993); 
State v. Reed, 592 P.2d 381, 382 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Martin, 495 A.2d 1028, 1032-33 
(Conn. 1985); State v. Kaye, 423 A.2d 1002, 1005 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); People v. 
Williams, 548 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); People v. Day, 541 N.Y.S.2d 463,467 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1989); Adame v. State, No. 07-99-0033-CR, 2001 WL 221622, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 
5, 2001). Meanwhile, the First, Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly declined to rule on 
this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 816 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234, 1242 (lith Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 883,981, 989 (1999); United States 
v. McCleary, 112 F.3d 511, 1997 WL 215525, at *5 (4th Cir. !997) (unpublished table decision); 
Autullo v. United States, 81 F.3d 163, 1996 WL 149346, at *5 (7th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table 
decision); United States v. Claudio, 44 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1995). 
19. See infra Part I. 
2002] ACCURACY WHERE IT MATTERS 5 
scholars have given Brady's application in the plea bargaining context any 
attention at all.20 
In the analysis below, I argue that Brady's role in protecting the innocent 
from Wrongful conviction is just as essential in the plea bargaining context as 
it is at trial, and that therefore even defendants who plead guilty should be 
entitled to Brady's protections. Still, I ultimately conclude that Brady's 
application in the plea bargaining context is destined to provide only a 
shadow of the protection Brady provides at trial because of the materiality 
standard currently used to judge post-plea Brady claims. In making both 
points, I employ a model of the plea bargaining defendant's decision-making 
process, using modern choice theory to demonstrate Brady's effect on the 
accuracy of convictions based on a guilty plea. Throughout the discussion, I 
consider guilty pleas and convictions to be accurate so long as they are 
supported by s.ome measure of factually guilty conduct.21 
Part I of this Article examines the judicial approaches currently used to 
extend Brady rights to defendants who plead guilty, concluding that the 
strongest doctrinal justification for applying Brady in the plea bargaining 
context looks to Brady's effect on the accuracy of a plea. Part II examines 
Brady's effect on the accuracy of guilty pleas, concluding that the disclosure 
of material, favorable information is necessary to prevent innocent 
defendants from falsely pleading guilty. Part III turns to Brady's materiality 
standard in the plea bargaining context, arguing that the showing currently 
required for post-plea Brady claims fails to realize Brady's accuracy-
enhancing potential. Part IV concludes the analysis, underscoring the 
20. This point was made in 1989, see McMunigal, supra note 16, at 958 (observing that more 
scholars have recognized the issue than analyzed it), and still holds true today. See Douglass, supra 
note 14, at 441 (noting that "[s]cholars have devoted surprisingly little attention to the issue"). Even 
those who address Brady's application to the guilty plea defendant have often done so while making a 
related, but different, analytic point. See, e.g., McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 933 n.l73 (advocating 
broad pre-plea discovery to minimize unconstitutional conditions inherent in plea bargaining); Eleanor 
J. Ostrow, Comment, The Case for Prep/ea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581, 1606-17 (1981) 
(advocating broad pre-plea discovery to maximize the consensual nature of plea bargaining 
transactions). 
21. While recognizing that guilt is more often a shade of gray than black or white, I treat 
defendants as either entirely guilty or entirely innocent to draw the most pointed conclusions regarding 
Brady's effect in the plea bargaining context. After all, the very essence of plea bargaining is 
compromise, so we should not expect plea bargains to be accurate in the sense of matching the 
particular level of a defendant's factual culpability. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1909 (noting 
that plea bargains differ from results at trial in that the sentences imposed upon defendants who plead 
guilty are lower, while the conviction rate for those who bargain is 100%); Ostrow, supra note 20, at 
1600 (noting that the offense to which a defendant pleads guilty is commonly different from the 
offense committed because plea bargaining is concerned with the consequences of a plea rather than 
the factual basis for it). One could, however, relax my starting assumptions and apply the same 
analysis, with similar, though diluted, results. 
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importance of protecting innocent defendants who plea bargain as well as 
those who contest their guilt at trial. 
I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: SQUARE PEGS IN A ROUND HOLE 
As mentioned above, state and federal courts across the country are 
divided as to whether defendants who plead guilty can claim Brady's 
protections.22 One circuit, in fact, has contradicted itself and answered the 
question both ways?3 Though most courts do allow guilty plea defendants to 
attack their plea by establishing a Brady violation, 24 there is little agreement 
as to how to doctrinally justify that result. 25 Why should defendants who 
plead guilty be allowed to make Brady claims when a guilty plea forfeits 
almost every other trial right?26 In the analysis below, I conclude that an 
interest in factually accurate pleas might justify that result, but only after 
identifying serious doctrinal and logical flaws in the judicial approaches 
currently used to justify post-guilty plea Brady claims. 
Before proceeding, however, a preliminary concession is in order. Even 
in the substantial minority of jurisdictions refusing to recognize post-guilty 
plea Brady claims, 27 defendants who plea bargain may still receive Brady 
information. After all, until defendants actually enter a guilty plea, they could 
always go to triaf8 -and the very possibility of going to trial may mandate 
22. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
23. Compare White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 422-24 (8th Cir. 1988) (considering a guilty 
plea defendant's Brady claim on the merits), with Smith v. United States, 876 F.2d 655, 657 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989) (holding that a guilty plea waives a defendant's Brady claim). New 
York is internally split as well. Compare People v. Day, 541 N.Y.S.2d 463,467 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) 
(holding that a guilty plea waives issues of factual guilt, including a Brady claim), with People v. 
Burney, 642 N.Y.S.2d 990 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that whether a Brady violation warrants 
setting aside guilty plea is determined by a multi-factored test), and People v. Armer, 501 N.Y.S.2d 
203,205-06 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea once a Brady 
violation is established). 
24. See infra Part I.A-C. 
25. See infra Part I.A-C. 
26. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973) (holding that a guilty plea 
defendant is barred from challenging an indictment by a grand jury that systematically excluded 
blacks, even though the defendant was unaware of the constitutional violation at the time of his plea); 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771-74 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea defendant is barred 
from raising a Fifth Amendment challenge to the voluntariness of his confession, despite 
constitutionally deficient state procedure for challenging confession at trial). See also Tollett, 411 U.S. 
at 267 ("When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the 
offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the 
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea."). 
27. See supra note 18. 
28. Indeed, it is not unheard of for defendants to profess their desire to contest guilt at trial, only 
to change their mind at the last minute and enter a guilty plea instead. See, e.g., Sieling v. Eyman, 478 
F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136, 1139-40 (Or. 1988), vacated by 492 
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some pretrial disclosures.29 Moreover, prosecutors taking the "high road" 
may decide to share Brady information with plea bargaining defendants even 
without a legal or ethical obligation to do so.30 The question, then, is not 
whether defendants who plea bargain will get Brady information; rather, the 
question is whether defendants who plea bargain have a remedy if they do 
not. Given that focus, the discussion below examines only those judicial 
approaches that provide a remedy in some form or fashion for established 
post-guilty plea Brady claims. 
A. Courts Holding That Brady Claims Negate the Voluntary and 
Intelligent Nature of a Guilty Plea 
Most courts willing to recognize Brady's application in the plea 
bargaining context conclude that an established Brady violation negates the 
voluntary and intelligent nature of a guilty plea, rendering the plea invalid. 31 
u.s. 912 (1989). 
29. Because Brady information must be disclosed in time for its effective use at trial, the need for 
pre-trial disclosure will necessarily vary with the type of Brady information at issue. LAFAVE ET AL., 
supra note 5, § 24.3(b), at 1105. Thus, for example, investigative leads on an alibi witness would 
require disclosure well before trial, but a witness's inconsistent statements could remain undisclosed 
until after trial has begun. In the latter example, a prosecutor's obligation under Brady and the Jencks 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (2000), which requires federal prosecutors to disclose witness's prior 
recorded statements after they testify, would merge. See id. § 24.3(c), at 1107 (discussing the possible 
overlap of Brady and Jencks Act obligations). 
30. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 457-6~ (discussing a prosecutor's incentives to disclose 
Brady information voluntarily during plea bargaining but ultimately finding those incentives 
inadequate). See also McMunigal, supra note 16, at 1024-27 (discussing the ambiguity in ethics rules 
over disclosure of Brady material in the plea negotiation process and the failure of formal discovery 
rules to protect guilty plea defendants or assure complete Brady disclosure). But see In re Grant, 541 
S.E.2d 540, 540 (S.C. 2001) (imposing disciplinary sanction on a prosecutor for not disclosing Brady 
information to a defendant before he pleaded guilty). To the extent ethical and legal compulsion to 
disclose Brady information to plea bargaining defendants is absent, any such disclosure becomes 
subject to the vagaries of prosecutors' individualized trial practice. See Uviller, supra note 2, at 113-14 
(describing informal discovery as capricious because it varies with local tradition, individual 
prosecutor's attitudes, personal relationships with defense attorneys, and the tactical advantage of 
sharing certain information). 
31. A guilty plea must be voluntary because it is a confession of factual guilt protected by the 
Fifth Amendment, and it must be intelligent because it represents a waiver of trial rights. Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,242-43 (1969). Though the Supreme Court has over time distanced itself from 
the waiver analogy, see United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 (1989); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 
U.S. 258 (1973), it has continued to adhere to the requirement that a plea be intelligent as well as 
voluntary. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998). The Court has, however, 
increasingly used the voluntariness requirement to address circumstances previously considered 
relevant to whether a plea was entered in an intelligent manner. Compare Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742 U.S. 742, 756 (1970) (holding that the defendant's plea was intelligently made because he 
received notice of the nature of the charge against him and had competent counsel to advise him), with 
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1989) (noting that competent counsel and notice of the 
nature of the charge are required for a voluntary plea); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 436 
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Still, courts taking this position differ as to how they reach that result. Some 
courts hold that Brady claims are sufficient per se to negate the voluntary and 
intelligent nature of a plea,32 while others consider a Brady violation to be 
just one of a number of circumstances relevant in determining whether a plea 
is voluntary and intelligent.33 Still others treat Brady claims as a type of 
governmental misrepresentation that either negates the voluntary and 
intelligent nature of a plea or renders the plea invalid despite its voluntary 
and intelligent nature.34 As discussed below, each approach has its own 
appeal-and its own pitfalls as well. 
1. The Per Se Approach 
A number of jurisdictions, most notably the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, have ruled that Brady violations are sufficient per se to negate 
the voluntary and intelligent nature of a guilty plea, automatically rendering 
the plea invalid. 35 Most attractive about the per se approach is its common 
sense recognition that guilty plea decisions made without information 
absolving a defendant (or at least reducing the penalty of a conviction) are 
not truly voluntary and intelligent-at least under any ordinary understanding 
of those terms.36 In addition, the per se approach to post-guilty plea Brady 
claims is attractive because it avoids the moral hazard problem that limiting 
(1983) (stating that notice of the nature of the charge is essential to a voluntary plea), and Henderson 
v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 & n.13 (1976) (noting that a plea may be involuntary because the 
defendant failed to receive notice of the charge). 
32. See infra Part I.A. I. 
33. See infra Part I.A.2. 
34. See infra Part I.A.3. 
35. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1995); People v. Carter, 
687 N.Y.S.2d 12, IS (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320, 324 (S.C. 1999); Ex 
parte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697, 700-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). See also supra note 14 (noting the 
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. 
Ct. 803 (2002) (mem.)). Interestingly, at least one jurisdiction uses the per se approach only when a 
prosecutor willfully suppresses Brady information. See Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131, 133-34 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1978). This qualification, however, appears to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 
disregard for a prosecutor's moral culpability in suppressing Brady evidence at trial. See text 
accompanying supra note II. See also Larry Kupers & John T. Philipsbom, Mephistophelian Deals: 
The Newest in Standard Plea Agreements, CHAMPION, Aug. 1999, at 18, 64 (distinguishing the Ninth 
Circuit's per se approach from approaches used by other circuits). 
36. The term "voluntary" generally means intentional, deliberate, and willful. See THE 
AMERJCAN HERJTAGE DICTIONARY 1355 (2d ed. 1991). The term "intelligent" generally means 
knowing or rational. See id. at 668. Given these definitions, a guilty plea could hardly be characterized 
as either voluntary or intelligent when it rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
circumstances surrounding the decision to plead guilty. 
2002] ACCURACY WHERE IT MATTERS 
. . 
9 
Brady to the trial context creates, negating any incentive prosecutors might 
otherwise have to withhold Brady information in hopes of eliciting a plea. 37 
Unfortunately, the per se approach is also beset with problems, most 
notably its dissonance with the Supreme Court's guilty plea jurisprudence. 
Under current Supreme Court precedent, a voluntary and intelligent guilty 
plea requires defendants to know only the charges against them and the 
consequences of pleading guilty, enabling even seriously uninformed guilty 
pleas to pass constitutional muster. 38 Indeed, the Court has specifically 
rejected the notion that a defendant is entitled to an accurate assessment of 
the government's case in order to enter a valid plea, reasoning instead that 
uncertainty is an inevitable part of the plea bargaining process.39 Thus, while 
common sense may tell us that a defendant needs Brady information to enter 
a voluntary and intelligent plea, the Supreme Court's indications are clearly 
to the contrary. 
Equally troubling, the per se approach appears to prove too much. If a 
valid guilty plea requires a truly informed choice, then it stands to reason that 
defendants are entitled to information in the government's files that is both 
for and against them. After all, a defendant will not know the strength of a 
prosecutor's case without both types of information, and the strength of the 
prosecutor's case is what a defendant most needs to know in order to engage 
in some semblance of informed decision-making about a plea.40 Still, it is 
well settled that prosecutors have no obligation to disclose inculpatory 
evidence to defendants as a prelude to a bargain or a trial. 41 Thus, the per se 
37. See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453. 
38. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 749-55 (1970). Moreoever, so long as defendants have competent 
counsel, the voluntary and intelligent nature of their pleas will be presumed. See id. at 757-58. 
39. See id. at 756-57 ("[Plea bargaining considerations] frequently present imponderable 
questions for which there are no certain answers .... A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea 
merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended 
the quality of the State's case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action."). See 
also Douglass, supra note 14, at 463-69 (recognizing that the Supreme Court's standards for a 
voluntary and intelligent guilty plea present formidable barriers to the application of Brady in the plea 
bargaining context). 
40. See Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1583 (arguing that a defendant must be able to assess his 
chances of acquittal in order to meaningfully consent to a plea bargain); infra Part II. A. 
41. At least one defendant has made the argument, though unsuccessfully. See United States v. 
Kidding, 560 F.2d 1303, 1313 (7th Cir. 1977) (rejecting defendant's claim that had the government 
disclosed inculpatory evidence before trial, he would have pleaded guilty to a bargain). See also 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 & n.20 (rejecting materiality standard that would focus on 
defendant's ability to prepare for trial because it would necessarily encompass both inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence); Douglass, supra note 14, at 468 (recognizing that the right to a fully informed 
plea would encompass information that is not even available to defendants who choose trial). 
Attempting to sidestep such logical difficulties, a few courts have held that a valid guilty plea 
requires only the information that a defendant is legally entitled to. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 
131, 133 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("The question for determination here is whether Lee [made] a knowing, 
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approach's rationale would support a duty to disclose more expansive than 
even Brady's proponents are willing to recognize. Given such fundamental 
doctrinal and logical difficulties, the per se approach falls far short of the 
persuasive justification necessary for recognizing Brady in the plea 
bargaining context. 
2. The Totality-ofthe-Circumstances Approach 
Several jurisdictions, including the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and 
Eighth Circuits,42 likewise recognize that a Brady claim can negate the 
voluntary and intelligentnature of a· guilty plea, but consider the totality of 
the circumstances in arriving at that result.43 Courts taking this approach 
view a Brady violation as just one of a number of relevant factors in 
determining whether a plea is voluntary and intelligent, focusing as much on 
the facts underlying a Brady claim as they do on the claim itself.44 Indeed, 
under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, a post-guilty plea Brady 
intelligent choice under circumstances where he was deprived of information to which by law he was 
entitled."); People v. Benard, 620 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245 (N.Y. County 1994) ("It is one thing for 
defendant and counsel to miscalculate the nature and persuasiveness of the prosecution's case. It is 
another for defendant and counsel to act without the benefit of information which is required to have 
been disclosed."). This solution, however, is equally problematic, for it assumes that a plea bargaining 
defendant is entitled to Brady information in the first place. 
42. But see supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting that the Eighth Circuit has contradicted 
itself and decided the Brady issue both ways). 
43. See, e.g., White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1988); Campbell v. 
Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1985); People v. Burney, 642 N.Y.S.2d 990 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). 
Interestingly, the court in State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994), used a totality-
of-the-circumstances approach in considering a defendant's Brady claim as part of a motion to 
withdraw his plea. See id. at 1148, 1150-53. In Gardner, however, the court held that a Brady violation 
would not be sufficient grounds to withdraw the plea if the information withheld pertained to a fact the 
defendant had admitted in open court when he pleaded guilty. See id. at 1151. The approach used in 
Gardner appears to be particularly problematic, for by the time a defendant formally enters a plea, that 
defendant has every reason to say whatever it takes to get a judge to accept the bargain. See Scott & 
Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1912 (describing plea hearings as "rigged to support the deal that the two 
attorneys have already struck"); Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1601 (recognizing a defendant's strong 
incentive to lie to a judge so that a plea bargain will be accepted); Lee Sheppard, Comment, Disclosure 
to the Guilty Pleading Defendant: Brady v. Maryland and the Brady Trilogy, 72 J. CRJM. L. & 
CRJMINOLOGY 165, 165-66 (1981) (noting that by the time a plea is formally entered, the interests of 
the defendant and the prosecutor are no longer adverse because both· want to ensure the success of the 
bargain). 
44. Factors considered by the Sixth Circuit include the factual basis for the plea (focusing on the 
defendant's in-court admission of guilt), the presence of proper plea-taking procedures, the assistance 
of competent counsel, the nature of the misconduct at issue compared to the misconduct at issue in the 
Brady trilogy, and likelihood that a constitutional violation had occurred. See Campbell, 769 F.2d at 
321-22. The Eighth Circuit's totality-of-the-circumstances analysis uses a similar approach, though it 
has considered at least one additional factor. See White, 858 F.2d at 424 (considering the benefit 
received by the defendant in pleading guilty). For a criticism of the Eighth Circuit's approach in 
considering a defendant's benefit from pleading guilty, see infra note 179. 
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claim-at least as a constitutional violation-need not be established at all.45 
Thus, even if defendants technically forfeit their Brady rights upon entering a 
guilty plea, courts adopting this approach will still consider the fact that the 
government suppressed favorable information when determining whether the 
defendant entered a voluntary and intelligent plea. 
The main attraction of the totality-of-the-circumstances approach is its 
ability to provide guilty plea defendants with relieffor Brady violations, even 
if the Supreme Court's guilty plea jurisprudence renders those violations not 
constitutionally cognizable.46 Like the per se approach, however, the totality-
of-the-circumstances approach is plagued by the fact that under the Court's 
guilty plea decisions, a Brady violation· ·is . unlikely, to have any effect 
whatsoever on the voluntary and intelligent nature of a defendant's guilty 
plea.47 Moreover, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach appears to be 
counterintuitive in recognizing the importance of information to a voluntary 
and intelligent plea while denying that a Brady violation is itself sufficient to 
render a plea invalid. Either a voluntary and intelligent plea requires 
informed decision-making, in which case Brady violations should be 
sufficient by themselves to render a plea invalid-or it does not, in which 
case Brady violations should have absolutely no effect on the validity of a 
plea.48 Both positions are easier to justify than the potential anomaly 
resulting under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, where one 
established Brady violation may invalidate a plea while another may not. 49 
45. The Sixth Circuit has gone so far as to question whether post-plea Brady violations as 
cognizable constitutional violations actually exist, noting that "ihere is no authority within our 
knowledge holding that suppression of Brady material prior to trial amounts to a deprivation of due 
process." Campbell, 769 F.2d at 322 (emphasis omitted). To say that a defendant need not establish a 
constitutional violation under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, however, is not to say that 
the constitutional status of a post-guilty plea Brady claim is entirely irrelevant. To the contrary, it is 
one of the factors considered in determining the voluntary and intelligent nature of a defendant's plea. 
See supra note 44. 
46. The totality-of-the-circumstances approach also follows the Supreme Court's admonition that 
when 'considering a challenge to a guilty plea, courts must ask whether the plea was voluntary and 
intelligent, not whether a constitutional violation has occurred. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742, 749 (1970). 
47. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
48. In short, if we afford Brady rights to the guilty plea defendant, those rights should, like Brady 
rights at trial, be sufficient to upset a conviction-especially considering the fact that even the most 
competent counsel cannot compensate for suppressed favorable information. See infra note 133. 
49. Exemplifying this anomaly, the Sixth Circuit in Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 
1985), held that the defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligent, while assuming that the facts 
presented would have established a valid Brady claim had the defendant taken his case to trial. See id. 
at 318. 
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It would appear, then, that the strength of the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach is also its weakness-the back-door treatment of 
Brady claims. 50 By treating Brady claims as more of a factual circumstance 
than an alleged constitutional violation, courts using this approach essentially 
strip Brady of its due process stature, rendering its protections on par with 
statutory mandates such as the factual basis requirement.51 As a result, the 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach may be more flexible than the per se 
approach, but the distinction makes no meaningful difference-neither 
approach provides a viable justification for recognizing post-guilty plea 
Brady claims. 
3. The Misrepresentation Approach 
. The third, and final, approach that courts use in holding that a Brady 
violation negates the voluntary and intelligent nature of a guilty ph~a treats 
suppressed Brady information as official misrepresentation or misconduct.52 
Under the Second Circuit's version of this approach, government 
misrepresentation provides a reason to invalidate a plea, even if the plea was 
voluntary and intelligent.53 Under the Tenth Circuit's version, by contrast, 
50. Indeed, many of the same factors considered under the totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach would be considered if a post-plea Brady claim were formally recognized because they are 
also relevant in determining whether the suppression of favorable evidence is material. See State v. 
Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144, 1152 (S.C. 1994) (recognizing that inquiry into the effect of a Brady violation 
on a defendant's plea decision is essentially the same as assessing the materiality of the suppressed 
evidence). For a discussion of Brady's materiality standard in the plea bargaining context, see infra 
Part III. 
51. See supra note 44. Of course, if the Sixth Circuit is correct in surmising that post-plea Brady 
claims do not exist in the first place, see Campbell, 769 F.2d at 322, then the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach gives guilty plea defendants more protection than they would have under an 
analysis considering Brady claims qua constitutional claims. . 
52. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 499 (lOth Cir. 1994); Miller v. Angliker, 848 
F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988); People v. Benard, 620 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) 
(explicitly following Miller v. Angliker). Even courts using other approaches to post-plea Brady claims 
have characterized those claims as alleging misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct. See, 
e.g., Campbell, 769 F.2d at 321 (considering a Brady claim in the larger class of "misconduct of 
constitutional proportions"); Gardner, 885 P.2d at I ISO (referring to a Brady claim as an allegation of 
"misconduct by the state"); Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320, 326 (S.C. 1999) (describing a Brady 
violation as a type of prosecutorial misconduct). Commentators have made the analogy as well. See, 
e.g., Barbara Gamer & John Petty, A Plea for Openness in Plea Bargaining, 16 GONZ. L. REv. 81, 94 
(1980) (arguing that failing to disclose Brady information in plea bargaining equates to 
misrepresentation); Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99 HARV. 
L. REv. 1004, 1007-12 (1986) (treating Brady violations as a form ofprosecutorial misconduct under 
the Supreme Court's guilty plea decisions). 
53. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[W]here prosecutors have 
withheld favorable material evidence even a guilty plea that was 'knowing' and 'intelligent' may be 
vulnerable to challenge.") (quoting Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320); Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320 ("[W]e 
conclude that even a guilty plea that was 'knowing' and 'intelligent' may be vulnerable to challenge if 
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government misrepresentation provides a reason to invalidate a plea because 
it renders the plea no longer voluntary and intelligent.54 In short, under the 
Tenth Circuit's version of the misrepresentation approach, Brady violations 
are an example of (rather than an exception to) the rule that only voluntary 
and intelligent pleas are valid. 
As a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court's guilty plea cases suggest that 
government misrepresentation does in fact negate the voluntary and 
intelligent nature of a plea, supporting the Tenth Circuit's version of the 
misrepresentation approach.55 However, both versions of this approach are 
unassailable under the Supreme Court's guilty plea decisions to the extent 
they hold that pleas based on official misrepresentation are invalid. 56 
Furthermore, both versions of the misrepresentation approach avoid the 
defmitional problems that arise when assessing Brady claims under the 
otherwise lax standards for a voluntary and intelligent plea.57 Equally 
appealing, the misrepresentation approach is imiquely compatible with the 
Supreme Court's view that Brady violations at trial constitute prosecutorial 
misconduct because they breach a prosecutor's duty to do justice. 58 
Nevertheless, even the misrepresentation approach to post-guilty plea 
Brady claims is not without its· share of doctrinal difficulties, for it has 
defmitional problems of its own. To justify post-plea Brady claims under the 
misrepresentation approach, a court must find that nondisclosure of Brady 
information before a defendant pleads guilty equates to misrepresentation. To 
make that finding, however, a court must determine that guilty plea 
defendants are entitled to Brady information in the first place. After all, a 
prosecutor's silence with regards to favorable information can only constitute 
misrepresentation ifthe prosecutor has a duty to disclose it. 59 Admittedly, the 
it was entered without knowledge of material evidence withheld by the prosecution."). 
54. See Wright, 43 F.3d at 495 (reasoning that a guilty plea does not prevent defendants from 
claiming that their plea resulted from prosecutorial misrepresentation because "( s ]uch claims directly 
challenge the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea"). 
55. For example, in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Supreme Court defined a 
voluntary plea in part by what it was not, explicitly excluding from its definition those pleas induced 
by threats, misrepresentation, and improper promises. /d. at 755. See also id. at 757 (recognizing 
"misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents" as a basis for invalidating a plea). 
56. See id.; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275,286 (1941) ("(I]f[the defendant] was deceived or 
coerced by the prosecutor into entering a guilty plea, ·he was deprived of a constitutional right.") 
(footnote omitted). What constitutes deception, however, remains to be determined. See infra text 
accompanying notes 59-62. 
57. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
58. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,219 (1982) (referring to "prosecutorial misconduct" and 
citing Brady); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963) (stating that suppressing evidence favorable 
to the accused "casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport 
with standards of justice"). 
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(d) (1981). Neither the Second nor the 
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misrepresentation analogy is more persuasive where a defendant requests 
Brady information and the prosecutor lies, saying there is none-or where a 
prosecutor provides only some information, concealing the rest. In the end, 
however, mere silence regarding favorable information (what Brady 
proscribes)60 cannot equate to misrepresentation absent an obligation to share 
it.61 That being the case, the misrepresentation approach is impossible to 
employ without at some point assuming the very duty to disclose it seeks to 
establish. 62 
It is tempting to interpret the misrepresentation approach broadly in an 
effort to elude its circular reasoning. One could, for example, .argue that the 
Supreme Court's refusal to uphold pleas based on misrepresentation reflects 
a defendant's larger due process right to fair treatment in plea bargaining. 
Supporting this view, a number of commentators have argued that Brady 
disclosure is essential to fair plea bargaining,63 and the Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of fairness in the plea bargaining context as a 
whole.64 Unfortunately, however, the Court's recognition of fairness as a due 
process bargaining constraint has meant only that the prosecution must keep 
any plea bargaining promises made-and even then, its failure to do so will 
only constitute a due process violation when defendants rely on the broken 
promise to their detriment.65 In that instance, however, the Court is 
essentially just enforcing a defendant's right to know the consequences 
attending a plea,66 and there is a palpable difference between defendants who 
Tenth Circuits appear to have recognized this difficulty; both simply assume that Brady violations 
equate to misrepresentation. See Wright, 43 F.3d at 495-96; Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320. 
60. See supra note I 0 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
62. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 59 (recognizing the potential for a misrepresentation-based 
analysis to be "question-begging"). 
63. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 14, at 2083 (arguing that Brady disclosure is an essential 
component of fundamentally fair plea bargaining process); Sheppard, supra note 43, at 166 
(maintaining that unfairness in plea bargaining results in part from a defendant's inability to obtain 
pertinent information); Gamer & Petty, supra note 52, at 82-83 (contending that notions of fair play 
require disclosure of Brady information in plea bargaining); Note, supra note 52, at 1019 (contending 
that fundamental notions of fairness necessitate disclosure of Brady information in the plea bargaining 
context). 
64. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (stating that tlie benefits of plea 
bargaining "presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor"). 
65. In Santobel/o v. New York, the Supreme Court held that due process required the state to keep 
its plea bargaining promises, see 404 U.S. at 262, but in Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984), the 
Court limited the rule set forth in Santobello to only those instances where the· defendant entered a 
guilty plea in reliance on the promises. See id. at 510. Thus, in Mabry, the defendant's due process 
claim failed because the state had withdrawn the plea offer at issue before the defendant entered his 
plea. !d. 
66. According to the Court in Mabry, Santobel/o was based on the notion that when prosecutors 
do not perform their end of the bargain, defendants' guilty pleas rest on false premises. !d. at 509. In 
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were deceived as to the true consequences of their pleas (because prosecutors 
failed to keep their promises) and defendants who knew the consequences of 
their pleas, but would not have preferred those consequences with better 
information. 
Ironically, even the Supreme Court's characterization of Brady violations 
as prosecutorial misconduct is of limited help;67 in the negotiation context, 
unlike at trial, hiding the weaknesses in one's case is considered an accepted 
convention.68 Thus, even if due process requires fair bargaining, fair 
bargaining may not require Brady disclosure. Establishing just what fair 
bargaining does require, however, returns us to the same problem that 
burdens the more narrow interpretation of the misrepresentation approach. If 
due process requires fair bargaining, we still have to defme what is fair, and 
Brady violations are only unfair if we say they are. Thus, neither version of 
the misrepresentation approach is free of question-begging difficulties, 
though those difficulties are perhaps less bothersome than those 
accompanying the per se and totality-of-the-circumstances approaches. 69 
the end; then, the Court's fair bargaining mandates are reduced to mere knowledge of the charge and 
the consequences of pleading guilty. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
67. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
68. See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosing Exculpatory Material in Plea 
Negotiations, 16 CRIM.JUST. 41,42 (2001) ("Although affirmative misrepresentation is generally seen 
as unethical, nondisclosure appears to be an accepted convention for negotiators."). See also Mabry, 
467 U.S. at 511 (noting that in plea bargaining, the due process clause is not a code of ethics for 
prosecutors); supra note 30 (noting ambiguity in ethics rules regarding a prosecutor's duty to disclose 
Brady information during plea bargaining). Although t~e Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized 
Brady's concern for prosecutorial ethics, see Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (discussing 
special duty of prosecutor to do justice); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (same); United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (same), the fact that even willful suppression of favorable 
evidence will not necessarily. establish a Brady violation suggests that reliance on ethical 
considerations alone to establish Brady's application in the plea bargaining context would be 
misplaced. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38. (even deliberate suppression of evidence will not amount to 
a Brady violation unless the evidence is material, but suppression of favorable evidence that is material 
will always amount to a Brady violation even if not deliberate); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 (same). See 
also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220 n.IO (1982) (even in the most egregious cases of willful 
prosecutorial misconduct, a new trial is appropriate only when trial outcome is affected). 
69. One could make the same criticism about Brady violations at trial constituting misconduct. 
Moreover, determining whether a Brady violation equates to misrepresentation in the plea bargaining 
context is arguably question-begging either way. See People v. Martin, 669 N.Y.S.2d 268, 276 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1998) (Rosenberger, J., dissenting) ("To say that the plea prevents examination of its own 
validity is .illogical."). To the extent that the question-begging difficulty is an inevitable aspect of 
interpreting the Supreme Court's misrepresentation language, the importance of assessing the viability 
of post-guilty plea Brady claims using independent criteria, such as accuracy interests, becomes even 
more apparent. 
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B. Courts Holding That Brady Claims Establish Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
As if to show just how varied judicial treatment of Brady in the plea 
bargaining context can be, a few courts willing to consider post-guilty plea 
Brady claims on the merits hold that such claims, if valid, establish a Sixth 
Amendment violation for ineffective assistance of counsel (and hence the 
invalidity of a plea).70 Most attractive about the Sixth Amendment approach 
is its appreciation of the fact that defense attorneys need Brady information 
in order to effectively counsel their clients about the type of plea they should 
enter.71 
Even so, the basic premise of the Sixth Amendment approach to post-
guilty plea Brady claims .is that "an attorney may render ineffective 
assistance through no fault of his own,"72 and that premise fundamentally 
misconstrues the Supreme Court's definition of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Under the Court's Sixth Amendment cases, an attorney's 
performance is only ineffective when it is grossly inappropriate under the 
circumstances, falling outside a wide range of professionally competent 
conduct.73 Hence, by definition, it is impossible for an attorney to be 
constitutionally ineffective without also being at fault. When it comes to 
Brady violations, however, a defense attorney's fault is never at issue; the 
duty to disclose belongs to prosecutors alone, regardless of what defense 
attorneys do or fail to do.74 Thus, Brady violations may in practice have a 
70. See, e.g., State v. Simons, 731 P.2d 797,801-02 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); Zacek v. Brewer, 241 
N.W.2d 41, 50-52 (Iowa 1976). See also Blank, supra note 14, at 2084 (arguing that a Brady violation 
precludes defense counsel from rendering constitutionally effective assistance); Gamer & Petty, supra 
note 52, at 91-92 (maintaining tha:t effective assistance of counsel is only possible where an attorney 
can assess the risks of trial for his client). 
71. See, e.g., Zacek, 241 N.W.2d at 51-52 (noting that effective assistance of counsel requires 
defense attorneys to properly evaluate facts). See also Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1978) ("[T]he defense cannot recommend a plea of guilty or discuss a plea of guilty with .a 
defendant unless they are aware of factors which might mitigate the case against their clients.") 
(internal quotations omitted). Even the Supreme Court has recognized the link between post-plea 
Brady claims and post-plea ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 
59 (1985) (recognizing "failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence" as an 
example of ineffective assistance of counsel that could result in an invalid plea). See also supra note 
70. . 
72. Zacek, 241 N.W.2d at 51. 
73. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (determining that the 
performance prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
outside a wide range of competence). 
74. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. If, however, a guilty plea defendant's Brady rights 
are waivable, see supra note 15, legal advice concerning such a waiver could conceivably provide the 
basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
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deleterious effect on the quality of an attorney's advice, but that effect lacks 
any constitutional significance whatsoever.75 
Considering Brady violations under the rubric of an ineffective assistance 
of counsel analysis is problematic for two other reasons as well. First, the 
Sixth Amendment approach assumes that defense attorneys require a certain 
amount of information to adequately advise their clients, leaving it 
vulnerable to all the logical and doctrinal problems that burden the other 
approaches based on informed decision-making discussed above. 76 Second, 
the Sixth Amendment approach is circuitous, distracting our attention from 
what a Brady violation is really about-the performance of a prosecutor, not 
a defense attomey.77 In light of all these considerations, the Sixth 
Amendment approach to post-plea Brady claims is a particularly 
unsatisfactory way to justify Brady's application in the plea bargaining 
context.78 
C. Courts Considering Brady Claims Under a Motion to Withdraw a 
Defendant's Guilty Plea 
As a final doctrinal avenue for extending Brady's protections to the plea 
bargaining defendant, it is worth noting that a number of state and federal 
courts consider Brady claims as part of a defendant's motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea. 79 Courts examining Brady claims in this context rely on statutory, 
75. To their credit, courts using a Sixth Amendment· approach are at least acting in accordance 
with the Supreme Court's admonition in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). In Tollett, the 
Court held that a defendant may attack the voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea only by showing 
that the advice he received from counsel was constitutionally deficient. See id. at 267. However, a 
literal reading of Tollett's language is clearly inappropriate. Although competent counsel may afford 
guilty pleas a presumption of being voluntary and intelligent, see supra note 38, no one would argue 
that a defendant coerced into pleading guilty is precluded from challenging the voluntariness of that 
plea just because he had admittedly competent counsel. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 55 ("A guilty 
plea entered at gunpoint is no less involuntary because an attorney is present to explain how the gun 
works."). 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41. 
77. See Sheppard, supra note 43, at 187-89 (recognizing circuitous nature of ineffective 
assistance of counsel approach to post-guilty plea Brady claims). · 
78. The fact that Brady violations do not also constitute Sixth Amendment violations makes 
independent recognition of Brady rights in the plea bargaining context even more important. After all, 
if a defense attorney's failure to discover favorable evidence is sufficient to invalidate a defendant's 
guilty plea, see supra note 71, why should the result be any different when the government hides the 
exact same information? In the first case, our problem with the plea is that it is' unreliable, see supra 
note 6, but that problem does not suddenly disappear because the party responsible for it has changed. 
79. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815-18 (3d Cir. 2001); Carroll v. State, 474 
S.E.2d 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Simons, 731 P.2d 797, 799-803 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); State 
v. Johnson, 544 So.2d 767 (La. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Parsons, 775 A.2d 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2001); State v. Davis, 823 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 
589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 500 S.E.2d 219 (Va. Ct. App. 1998). 
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rather than constitutional, authority to set aside a defendant's conviction, 
though constitutional considerations are sometimes given · statutory 
significance as well.80 Although the precise standard for considering post-
plea Brady claims in this fashion varies across jurisdictions, courts using a 
statutory approach usually ask whether a defendant's Brady claim provides a 
"fair and just reason" to withdraw a. plea if the motion is made before 
sentencing,81 and whether denying the motion would result in "manifest 
injustice" if the motion to withdraw the plea is made after sentencing.82 
Because motions to withdraw a guilty plea are typically left to a trial court's 
sound discretion, the s.tandard for reviewing Brady claims considered under a 
statutory approach is highly defe~ential. 83 · 
Courts considering 'post~ guilty plea Brady claims as part of a defendant's 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea have little choice but· to examine those 
clai~s in light of the statUtory context in which they were brought. 84 Still, a 
court's discretionary power to allow defendants to withdraw their plea based 
on a Brady violation is hardly the type of gliaranteed protection on which a 
plea bargaining defendant can rely.85 Moreover, because courts typically 
Naturally, courts can consider post-guilty plea Brady claims as part of a defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea regardless of their position on the viability of those claims as constitutional 
violations. See United States v. Lampaziane, 251 F.3d 519, 523-25 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
alleged Brady violation is nonjurisdictional challenge waived by guilty plea, but considering facts of 
claim anyway to decide defendant's motion to withdraw his plea); United States v. Millan-Colon, 829 
F. Supp. 620, 634-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (recognizing the misrepresentation approach but considering a 
post-plea Brady claim under defendant's motion to withdraw his plea); United States v. Ayala, 690 F. 
Supp. 1014, 1016-17 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (same). 
80. Some courts, in fact, hold. that where a constitutional violation is established, defendants are 
automatically entitled to withdraw their pleas. See, e.g., Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d at 593; State v. 
Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). 
81. Rule 32(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant may 
withdraw his plea with the court's permission. FED. R. CRJM. P. 32(e). Rule 32(e) further provides that 
a defendant's motion to withdraw made prior to sentencing will be granted upon a showing of a fair 
and just reason. !d. See also Aram A Schvey & Katherine Gates, Twenty-Ninth Annual Review of 
Criminal Procedure: Guilty Pleas, 88 GEO. L.J. 1228, 1257-59 (2000) (discussing Rule 32(e) 
requirements). 
82. See, e.g., Carroll, 474 S.E.2d at 740 (rioting that withdrawal of plea is appropriate only to 
correct manifest injustice); Simons, 731 P.2d at 799 (stating that the withdrawal of a guilty plea after 
sentencing is proper only to correct manifest injustice); Jefferson, 500 S.E.2d at 223 (same). 
83. See, e.g., Carroll, 474 S.E.2d at 740 (reviewing the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard); Simons, 731 P.2d at 803 (same); 
Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d at 593 (sarne). 
84. But see United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1998) (determining that if a 
Brady violation is established, statutory framework allowing trial courts the discretion to deny a 
defendant's motion to withdraw is inappropriate). 
85. Because this approach relies on statutory authority to provide a guilty plea defendant relief 
for a Brady violation, the protection afforded is (at least in theory) subject to the whim of state and 
federal legislatures. Moreover, the discretion afforded to judges under this approach means that even 
established Brady violations may not result in the withdrawal of a defendant's plea. Of course, in 
2002] ACCURACY WHERE IT MATTERS 19 
consider prejudice to the government in exerclSlng their discretion on 
motions to withdraw a plea, the statutory approach to post-plea Brady claims 
could lead to unfair results, . holding against the defendant what the 
government brought upon itself.86 Thus, while the statutory approach to post-
plea Brady claims may avoid the pitfalls of a constitutional analysis, it is still 
the least attractive option for guaranteeing Brady protections to the plea 
bargaining defendant. 
D. Another Way? 
Given the above discussion, "rione of the judicial approaches currently 
used to justify post-plea Brady claims seem particularly satisfactory. This 
recognition, in fact, is one reason a substantial minority of courts have 
concluded that Brady claims do not survive a plea.87 Still, the Supreme 
Court's guilty plea cases appear to provide another, thus far overlooked, 
possible basis for recognizing post-plea Brady claims-Brady's affect on the 
accuracy of convictions based on a guilty plea. 88 Without a doubt, the 
Supreme Court's guilty plea cases rely heavily on the assumption that a 
jurisdictions holding that fonnal consideration of defendants' Brady claims are barred by their 
subsequent guilty pleas, the statutory approach may be defendants' only option. See Lampaziane, 251 
F.3d at 523-25 (holding that the alleged Brady violation is a nonjurisdictional challenge waived by 
guilty plea, but considering the facts of the claim anyway to decide the defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea). 
86. See United States v. Avellino; 136 F.3d 249, 262 (3d Cir. 1998) ("And in the context of a 
proven Brady violation, we would think it entirely inappropriate to allow the government to defeat the 
motion [to withdraw a plea] by arguing that the warranted remedy for its own constitutional violation 
is likely to cause it prejudice."). See also Schvey & Gates, supra note 81, at 1257 & n.1304 (noting 
that Rule 32(e) motions to withdraw a plea shifts the burden to the government to show prejudice from 
the withdrawal once the defendant establishes a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea). Some 
courts, however, have resolved this tension by holding that where a constitutional violation is 
established, a defendant has established manifest injustice as a matter of law. See supra note 80. 
87. The Fifth Circuit's recent opinion in Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000), 
provides perhaps the most thoughtful explanation of the minority view. See id. at 360-64. For a listing 
of other courts refusing to recognize post-guilty plea Brady claims, see supra note 18. 
88. Though a few courts have considered the accuracy of a defendant's conviction in ruling on a 
post-guilty plea Brady claim, none thus far appear to have recognized accuracy as its own doctrinal 
justification for considering those claims. See, e.g., Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 370 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 291 (2000) (refusing to recognize habeas petitioner's post-plea Brady claim 
while noting confidence in his factual guilt); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416,423 (8th Cir. 1988) 
(applying the totality-of-the-circumstances approach and considering the factual basis supporting a 
defendant's guilty plea); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 321-22 (6th Cir .. 1985) (same); State v. 
Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144, 1148, 1151-52 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that a Brady violation 
equates to 'manifest injustice' while questioning the defendant's factual guilt). The court in Banks v. 
United States, 920 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Va. 1996), comes closest to justifying post-plea Brady claims 
based on the accuracy interests they promote, though even in that case the court only used accuracy 
interests as a reason to follow other circuits recognizing post-plea Brady claims, rather than as an 
independent doctrinal justification. See id. at 691. 
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guilty plea defendant is in fact guilty.89 Indeed, the presumption that guilty 
pleas are factually accurate is the very reason the Court has been unwilling to 
upset the finality of a guilty plea.90 At the same time, however, the Supreme 
Court's guilty plea cases clearly contemplate the continuing viability of 
constitutional claims necessary to ensure the factual accuracy of a plea.91 In 
fact, the Court has explicitly (though perhaps inartfully) stated that a guilty 
plea only precludes those claims consistent with factual guilt and conviction 
once factual guilt is established.92 Hence, post-plea Brady claims may be 
89. _See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("Defendants advised by 
competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of 
intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self-
condemnation."); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757-58 (1970) (noting that defendant's claim 
did not question the truth or reliability of his guilty plea); McMann v Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 773 
(1970) (same); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797 n.IO (1970) (noting the record's silence as 
to any circumstance doubting the integrity of the defendant's guilty plea). See also McCoy & Mirra, 
supra note 2, at 926 (noting that the Court's requirements that a plea be voluntary, intelligent, and in 
some instances supported by a factual basis are consistent with an attempt to limit inaccurate results). 
90. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757-58 (noting that the outcome of the 
defendant's case might be different if the Court believed that innocent defendants falsely condemn 
themselves); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 773 (finding the defendant's coerced confession 
claim irrelevant because his conviction was based on a guilty plea, not the allegedly coerced 
confession, and the admissibility of that confession had no bearing on the accuracy of the plea). Given 
its starting assumption that guilty pleas are accurate, the Court's general unwillingness to recognize 
post-plea constitutional claims is hardly remarkable. As Professor Alschuler has noted in discussing 
the Supreme Court's guilty plea cases, 
It would have been enough for the Court to have said: "These defendants have solemnly admitted 
their guilt, and that being so,. we do not care what may have happened to them in the past. The 
whole purpose of criminal proceedings is to determine whether a defendant is guilty, and once that 
question is satisfactorily answered in the affirmative, the state's consequent right to incarcerate the 
defendant is established absolutely." 
Alschuler, supra note 3, at 32-33. Ultimately, Professor Alschuler rejects this view of the Supreme 
Court's guilty plea cases, though his analysis did not consider the Court's late 1975 decision in Menna 
v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (presumably because the article was written before Menna was 
decided). Still, even Professor Alschuler's analysis cites as an "extreme example" of an obviously 
invalid plea the case where a prosecutor deliberately misleads defense counsel concerning the nature 
of the state's evidence. See id. at 33. 
91. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (explaining that a guilty plea stops 
the criminal adjudication process and that therefore a guilty plea defendant may not make claims 
independent of factual guilt relating to· constitutional violations that occurred before the plea was 
entered); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757-58 (professing to take "great precautions" to guard 
against inaccurate pleas and expecting lower courts to do the same, ensuring that there is nothing to 
question the reliability of a defendant's admission of guilt). See also Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 
(1975), discussed at infra note 92. 
92. In Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), the Supreme Court departed from its general 
approach to guilty pleas and allowed a post-plea double jeopardy claim to be heard. In explaining why 
the case at bar was different from other claims that the Court had held were barred by a defendant's 
guilty plea, the Court explained: 
The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so 
reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt 
from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition of 
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doctrinally viable if, like post-plea Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims, they are vital to protecting the assumption underlying the 
Court's guilty plea cases as a whole-that defendants who plead guilty are in 
fact guilty.93 
At least at first glance, relying on accuracy interests to doctrinally justify 
post-plea Brady claims is particularly appropriate for two reasons. First, the 
chief goal of the criminal justice system-indeed, its very reason for 
existence-is to accurately sort the factually guilty and innocent.94 Thus, if 
Brady plays a necessary role in that sorting process, its legitimacy in the plea 
bargaining context is difficult to deny. Second, Brady's sole purpose at trial 
is to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction.95 Thus, if Brady does 
apply in the plea bargaining context, common sense tells us it is because 
Brady can serve the same purpose there. The question, then, becomes one of 
Brady's impact on the accuracy of guilty pleas, to which I turn next.96 
punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not 
logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the 
way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established. 
!d. at 62 n.2. Though the Court's use of a triple negative in the above passage is less than helpful, its 
point remains (fairly) clear: a guilty plea presumptively resolves the issue of factual guilt, so unless a 
post-plea claim questions that presumption-Qr, as in Menna, questions the imposition of punishment 
even when factual guilt is established-it is irrelevant and therefore precluded. 
93. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 967 (noting the compatibility of Brady and the Supreme 
Court's guilty plea jurisprudence). Naturally, the analysis that follows assumes that the Supreme Court 
is sincere in its stated desire to protect the innocent defendant tempted to plea bargain. Others have 
questioned this premise. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 30-37 (recognizing the Court's professed 
concern for accurate guilty pleas, but questioning its sincerity). 
94. See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 2002 (stating that the criminal justice system's mission is to 
ascertain guilt and appropriate punishment); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect 
Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2012 (1992) (noting that 
the core function of the criminal justice process is the separation of the innocent from the guilty); 
McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 915-16 (stating that a state's criminal procedure system is designed 
to accurately identify the guilty and innocent). See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935) ("The twofold arrn of[the law] is that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer."). 
95. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (noting that the question under Brady is 
whether the defendant received a fair trial, meaning a trial verdict worthy of confidence); United States 
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,678 (1985) ("Consistent with 'our overriding concern with the justice of the 
finding of guilt,' a constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must be reversed, only if the 
evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial.") (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976))) (citation omitted); United States v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (noting Brady's overriding concern with the fairness of the finding of 
guilt). 
96. It would be a mistake to assume that because a constitutional right is essential to be accuracy 
of convictions at trial, it is automatically essential to the accuracy of convictions following a plea. In 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), for example, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's 
coerced confession claim was barred by his guilty plea, id. at 773, although the Fifth Amendment's 
protection against coerced confessions is undoubtedly designed to protect the accuracy of convictions 
at trial. See Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The Stale's Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1039 n.113 (1987) ([S]ome rights, such as the rights which guard against coerced 
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II. BRADY'S EFFECT ON THE ACCURACY OF CONVICTIONS BASED ON A 
GUILTY PLEA 
Any assessment of Brady's effect on the accuracy of convictions based on 
guilty plea must begin with a closer look at the nature of Brady's duty to 
disclose. Recall that Brady only requires the disclosure of information that is 
both favorable to the defense and material to guilt or punishment.97 Focusing 
first on Brady's materiality requirement, defendants at trial must establish "a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different."98 Usually, this 
requirement leads courts to ask whether there is a reasonable probability (i.e., 
a good chance) that with Brady disclosure a defendant would have been 
acquitted at trial, though conceivably courts could also ask whether a 
defendant would have just received a lighter sentence.99 Thus, at least at trial, 
Brady's materiality standard typically results in a defendant's conviction 
being overturned whenever a court's confidence in the accura~y of that 
conviction is seriously shaken. 100 
Given the nature of Brady's materiality standard at trial,' it is not 
surprising that the doctrine plays a crucial role there in protecting the 
innocent defendant from wrongful conviction. Indeed, Brady disclosure is 
perfectly aligned with accuracy interests in the trial context, reversing a 
conviction only when we believe the defendant may well be innocent. 
Assuming Brady's materiality standard in the guilty plea context does the 
same thing, 101 the doctrine's accuracy-enhancing effect on convictions 
supported by a guilty plea is equally clear. Because of Brady's materiality 
standard, guilty plea defendants who can establish a valid Brady claim by 
confessions, specifically protect the accuracy of the fact-finding process."). Indeed, before McMann 
was decided, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that allowing coerced confessions to come 
before a jury posed a danger of convicting the innocent. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719,728 
(1966). See also Alschuler, supra note 3, at 34 (criticizing the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize 
that claims affecting the accuracy of trial will automatically affect the accuracy of guilty pleas as well). 
97. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
98. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (relying on Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,694 (1984)). 
99. Ironically, Brady involved the suppression of evidence relevant to the defendant's 
punishment rather than guilt. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963). At trial, Brady admitted his 
involvement in a first-degree murder but claimed that a companion, Boblit, committed the actual 
killing. Based on that version of events, Brady's attorney argued to the jury that his client should be 
spared the death penalty. /d. The jury rejected the argument and sentenced Brady to death. /d. After 
trial, Brady's attorney discovered that the prosecution had suppressed a statement by Boblit admitting 
that he had actually strangled the victim, despite a request to see all of Boblit's out-of-court 
statements. /d. 
I 00. See supra note 95. 
I 0 I. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
2002] ACCURACY WHERE IT MA TIER~ 23 
defmition also establish that they may well be innocent. Given that point, it is 
difficult to imagine how Brady could not play a crucial role in promoting 
accurate convictions based on a plea. Still, Brady's accuracy-enhancing 
effect on guilty pleas is not solely attributable to its materiality standard; the 
fact that Brady requires disclosure of information favorable to the defense 
matters too. To understand why, we first need some understanding of a 
defendant's decision-making process in considering a plea, which modem 
choice theory applied to the plea bargaining context provides.102 
A. TheModel 
. I .! ' ~'": ~· ". t l '" . : , , 
Using choice theory to explain the actions of plea pargaining parti<;:s is 
hardly new. 103 Simply stated, choice theory tells us that prosecutors and 
defendants plea bar~ain because both parties can avoid the costs and 
uncertainties of trial. 04 When a conviction .at trial appears . imminent, plea 
bargaining allows prosecutors to save the costs of going to trial, which they 
disproportionately bear, and allows the defendants to benefit from those cost 
savings, as well as any cost savings of their own. 105 When a conviction at 
trial is less than certain, the push to plea bargain is even stronger. Defendants 
bargain to avoid the chance that they could be convicted at trial and receive a 
higher (possibly maximum) sentence, while prosecutors bargain to avoid the 
possibility that trial could yield no conviction at all. 106 Thus, when the 
outcome at trial is uncertain, both parties have something to lose by going to 
trial aside from the cost of trial itself, and their incentive to plea bargain 
increases to the extent that they believe their worst case scenario may come 
true. 
I 02. Of course, not every guilty plea results from a plea bargain, but the overwhelming majority 
do, and regardless, the decision-making dynamics are the same. In both cases, defendants consider the 
costs of a conviction against its benefits, which include avoiding the punishment, personal 
embarrassment, and financial outlay of trial. Thus, for analytical purposes, I treat every plea as a 
bargained-for plea. See Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1593-94 (noting that it is futile to distinguish 
between implicit and explicit inducements to plead guilty because both have the same effects on a 
defendant's decision-making). . , . 
103. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2. 
104. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1935-40 (discussing incentives to plea bargain). The very 
fact that defendants have a choice other than trial allows them to possibly improve their situation. See 
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 309 (noting that defendants presumably make 
themselves better off by plea bargaining or they would not strike the deals). 
I 05. Taking a case to trial is more costly than settling it, and this is true to an even greater extent 
for prosecutors who have limited resources and a seemingly unlimited number of cases. See 
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 297; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1935. 
106. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1936-40. This is not to deny that prosecutors bargain to 
spare the costs of trial too. See supra note I 05 and accompanying text. 
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Setting aside for a moment the additional costs associated with trial, the 
corresponding risks that both prosecutors and defendants face lead them to 
engage in essentially the same pre-plea decision-making analysis. 107 Both 
parties identify their best option by weighing the uncertain but harsh 
punishment at trial against the certain but lower punishment of a plea 
bargain; the only difference between the two is whether their best option 
imposes more punishment or less. 108 All other things being equal, rational 
defendants will only bargain if they believe that the punishment in a plea 
offer is less than the punishment that would result from a conviction at trial, 
taking into account the fact that at trial they at least have a chance of 
acquittal. 109 Rational prosecutors, by contrast, will only bargain if, all other 
things being equal, they believe a plea offer imposes more punishment than 
what they could get following a conviction at trial, again taking into account 
the chance of acquittal there. 110 Because both prosecutors and defendants are 
just looking to improve their lots vis-a-vis trial, each party will most likely 
find a number of plea offers attractive, some being better deals than others. 111 
I 07. I temporarily set aside the cost impetus to plea bargain in order to isolate the parties' reaction 
to risk. Moreover, because the cost of going to trial is greater for prosecutors than defendants, see 
supra note I 05, considering the costs of trial at this point unnecessarily complicates the analysis 
without adding much predictive power to the defendant's decision-making process, the ultimate focus 
of the model. For a model that simultaneously considers both factors, see Easterbrook, Criminal 
Procedure, supra note 3, at 331-32. For a discussion of Brady's effect on a prosecutor's cost impetus 
to bargain, see infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text. 
108. In short, both parties compare the expected punishment of trial with the expected punishment 
of a plea bargain, both taking into account the chance of no punishment at all (i.e., an acquittal) at trial. 
Defendants maximize their well-being by choosing the option with the lowest expected punishment 
amount, while prosecutors do just the opposite. For more complex versions of this model, see 
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 331-32; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1936-40. 
109. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 894 (noting that defendants choose the course of action 
that keeps their penalty to a minimum-even if it means pleading guilty); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, 
at 1961 ("If the prosecutor wants to reach a bargain, she must offer the defendant something better 
than the expected value of going to trial, discounted for the defendant's risk aversion."). See also 
Douglass, supra note 14, at 447 (stating that defendants plea bargain because they believe the bargain, 
a reduced sentence, is preferable to the result that would follow at trial, a higher sentence). 
110. Restating the parties' basic treatment of uncertainty in formulaic fashion, rational defendants 
will plead guilty when in their estimate C(t) x P(t) > P(pb), where C(t) is the chance of conviction at 
trial, P(l) is the punishment expected at trial assuming a conviction, and P(pb) is the certain 
punishment accompanying a plea bargain. For rational prosecutors, just the opposite is true; they will 
strike a deal only when in their estimate C(t) x P(t) < P(pb). 
Ill. Judge Easterbrook recognizes the same point, but uses the terms "maximum settlement offer" 
and "minimum settlement demand" to represent the least attractive plea bargain each side would be 
willing to accept. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 297. Under Judge 
Easterbrook's model, defendants would find any offer attractive that was below their maximum 
settlement demand (i.e., the most punishment they would be willing to take), while prosecutors would 
find any offer attractive that was above their minimum settlement demand (i.e., the least amount of 
punishment they would be willing to agree to). See id. The principle, however, is the same: both sides 
have an array of possible plea bargains that they will, to varying degrees, find attractive. 
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Thus, when considering both parties' choice dynamics together, we should 
envision an overlapping range of mutually advantageous plea bargains, rather 
than a single "hit or miss" bargaining point. 112 
For defendants choosing between trial and a plea, the outcome of the 
above analysis turns on the estimated chance of conviction at trial because 
the other two factors in the equation-the expected punishment at trial and 
expected punishment following a plea-are generally known. 113 If the chance 
of conviction at trial is quite high, a defendant will most likely take a plea 
offer with punishment only slightly lower than that expected at trial; 
defendants who believe they will be convicted anyway will generally take 
whatever discount in punishment they can get. Conversely, if the chance of 
conviction at trial is exceedingly low, a defendant will likely pass on even the 
sweetest of deals; defendants who are certain they will be acquitted at trial 
will generally find no offer of punishment attractive. Thus, for defendants, 
the estimated chance of conviction at trial is crucial to pre-plea decision-
making because it affects the minimal senten~ing differential (i.e., the 
difference between punishment at trial and punishment under a plea) required 
to make pleading guilty their best option. In short, the lower the estimated 
chance of conviction at trial, the more lucrative a plea offer must be. 114 
Unfortunately, however, the chance of conviction at trial depends to a 
large extent on something a defendant knows relatively little about: the 
prosecutor's case. liS Though a defendant may have some knowledge of the 
prosecutor's case from both formal and informal discovery, knowledge of all 
(or even the most important part) of it is unlikely. 116 As a result, defendants 
have to hazard a guess as to the overall strength of the government's 
evidence, which is where their knowledge of guilt or innocence becomes 
important. Typically, defendants know whether or not they are guilty of the 
112. Seeid. 
113. Admittedly, to some extent the punishment expected at trial is also unknown, but under any 
scenario a defendant at least knows the maximum punishment possible for a particular offense, while 
sentencing guidelines give an even more precise idea of the likely punishment. A prosecutor's 
willingness to bargain also turns on the estimated chance of conviction at trial, though prosecutors' 
information deficits are different. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1936-37. 
114. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 895. 
115. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 448. The other factor affecting the chance of conviction of 
trial is the strength of the defendant's case, which a defendant does know something about. See Scott 
& Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1936-37. 
116. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 457-61 (discussing prosecutorial incentives to disclose 
inculpatory and exculpatory information, but ultimately finding them inadequate to assure full 
disclosure); Steven L. Friedman, Comment, Preplea Discovery: Guilty Pleas and the Likelihood of 
Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 529-32 (1971) (criticizing informal and formal discovery 
devices as a means of informing a defendant about the prosecutor's case). 
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offense charged. 117 Thus, some know they are guilty and some (hopefully 
fewer) know they are innocent, while a few are unsure of their status either 
way because of some ambiguity in the facts, the law, or both. Though all 
three groups have every incentive to protest their innocence to a prosecutor, 
their private knowledge of guilt or innocence (where·existent) affects the way 
they individually assess their chance of conviction at trial and the way they 
weigh their options once that basic assessment is made. 
To the extent we have any confidence whatsoever that evidence reflects 
reality, we expect a prosecutor's case to be weaker where a defendant is 
factually innocent than where a defendant is factually guilty. 118 After all, if a 
defendant is truly innocent, there can only be so much evidence erroneously 
suggesting guilt. In this regard, defendants' expectations are no different; 
factually innocent defendants are generally more optimistic than guilty ones 
in predicting the strength of the government's evidence at trial. 119 Indeed, 
only guilty defendants have an exceptionally good reason to assume the 
worst: they know they committed the crime. Thus, at least where they know 
their status, innocent and guilty defendants will likely treat certain plea offers 
differently because they make systematically different assessments of their 
chance of conviction at trial. Because innocent .defendants are more 
optimistic about the chance of an acquittal, they will view deals that would 
be marginally advantageous for a guilty defendant as not advantageous at 
all.12o 
Even so, defendants who know they are innocent have another reason to 
choose trial that guilty defendants do not: righteous indignation. For the 
factually guilty defendant, pleading guilty may not be ideal, but it is not a 
travesty of justice. For the innocent defendant, a guilty plea is exactly that. It 
is false self-condemnation, which common sense tells us no defendant will 
undertake lightly. 121 Thus, one would expect innocent defendants to make 
117. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1936-37; McMunigal, supra note 16, at 984 (recognizing that 
cases where defendants are without such information are limited). Prosecutors, by contrast, know the 
strength of their case but not whether a given defendant is truly innocent or guilty. Scott & Stuntz, 
supra note 2, at 1936-37. See also infra note 130. 
118. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1937. 
119. McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 924. See also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1937 
(recognizing that a defendant's true conduct with regard to an alleged offense bears powerfully on that 
defendant's prediction about the evidence at trial). 
120. See Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 1969-70; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal 
Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 80 n.97 (1988). Concededly, a 
defendant's optimism in assessing the chance of conviction at trial will be affected by other factors as 
well, including faith in the defendant's defense attorney and what the attorney said about the chance of 
conviction at trial. Factors such as these, however, are not sufficiently systematic to be accounted for 
in any meaningful way. 
121. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 894 (recognizing that even innocent defendants facing 
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fewer deals than guilty defendants not just because their estimate of the 
chance of conviction at trial is lower, but also because they are more 
reluctant to plead guilty in the first place. 
At least two authors, Professors Scott and Stuntz, have disagreed with this 
contention, arguing. that ·innocent defendants are highly risk averse and 
therefore just as likely to bargain (in fact, more so in certain instances) as 
their factually guilty counterparts. 122 According to Professors Scott and 
Stuntz, guilty defendants are more prone to risk-taking than those who are 
innocent because the very act of committing a crime suggests a preference 
for gambling. 123 Though the premise underlying this argument-that 
criminals tend to be risk-takers-is reasonable enough, the same rationale 
suggests that innocent defendants will also be risk-takers, at least where they 
have a criminal history. 124 Indeed, individuals with a criminal past may be 
particularly susceptible to false charges not only because police "round up 
the usual suspects" when investigating certain crimes, but also because police 
may assume, based on a person's prior indiscretions, that an otherwise 
ambiguous act was committed with criminal intent. 125 Thus, while criminal 
activity may be an effective indicator of a defendant's risk-taking 
proclivities, it is not perfectly (or even consistently or predictably) matched 
to factually guilty defendants alone. 126 To the extent that innocent defendants 
have a criminal background, they could be risk takers too. 
Even innocent defendants without a criminal background, however, have 
unique reasons to resist falsely pleading guilty. As others have noted, the 
collateral consequences. of a conviction (even under a plea) are 
disproportionately large for defendants whose records are otherwise clean.127 
strong cases may choose trial just to vindicate themselves). 
122. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1948-49. 
123. /d.at1943. 
124. Professors Scott and Stuntz implicitly recognize the problem by noting: "(R]isk aversion is a 
much more plausible assumption where innocent defendants are concerned (especially those with 
relatively clean records)." /d. (emphasis added). 
125. This famous line from the movie Casablanca is not far from reality, reflecting our intuition 
that those who have committed crime before may well commit it again. The same idea explains why, 
for example, police trying to solve a burglary will focus their attention on known burglars in the area, 
whether or not that focus is justifiable. Although as a practical matter a criminal history may be helpful 
in investigating crime, we also know that it can erroneously suggest guilt. Indeed, this risk is the 
rationale behind Rule 404 of the Federal· Rules of Evidence, which generally excludes the use of 
character evidence to establish a defendant's guilt at trial. See FED. R. Evto. 404 advisory committee 
note. 
126. In short, defendants who have a criminal record may well be innocent of the crime charged, 
just as defendants without a criminal record may well be guilty. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 
1944 (recognizing that lack of a prior record will not help a prosecutor identify factually innocent 
defendants). 
127. See, e.g., McMunigal, supra note 16, at 987-88 (comparing the disincentives to plead guilty 
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Thus, at least in some instances, the stigma· and possible employment 
consequences of a conviction may make the innocent defendant without a 
criminal record unwilling (or unable) to plead to anything at all. Moreover, 
innocent defendants without a criminal record may assume, erroneously or 
not, that they have less need for leniency from a prosecutor because their lack 
of prior convictions will get them some leniency from the judge. 128 Given 
these considerations, it is difficult to conclude that the risk preferences of 
innocent and guilty defendants differ in a significant or meaningful way, 
particularly as a factor offsetting the bargaininf: dynamic differences between 
the two groups that are otherwise undisputed. 29 That being the case, choice 
theory tells us exactly what we might surmise just by using common sense: it 
is more difficult to get an innocent defendant to plead guilty than a defendant 
who is in fact guilty. 130 
To conclude that it is more difficult to get innocent defendants to plead 
guilty, however, is not to say that they will never do so. Rather, it means that 
innocent defendants require a larger sentencing differential to find a plea 
bargain attractive than do factually guilty defendants, who are more willing 
to strike a deal in the first place. 131 In· other words, because innocent 
for defendants who have a record with the disincentives to plead guilty for defendants who do not have 
a record). . 
128. In other words, defendants· with clean records discount the likely punishment at trial. /d. at 
987. 
129. Even Professors Scott and Stl!ntz recognize that an innocent defendant's estimate of the 
chance of conviction at trial will differ from that of the guilty defendant. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, 
at 1937-39. · 
130. Several commentators agree with this proposition. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, 
supra note 3, at 1969-70; McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 924-25; Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1983. 
Interestingly, Professors Scott and Stuntz posit that even if innocent defendants are more likely than 
guilty defendants to refuse initially to bargain, guilty defendants will copy innocent defendants' 
actions to (falsely) signal their innocence in hopes of triggering better offers, thereby erasing any 
differences between the two groups that otherwise might have existed. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 
1946. I find this rejoinder unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the guilty defendant's ability to copy the 
innocent defendant's actions is limited. At some point, prosecutors under their own bargaining 
constraints (political, office-policy-related, or otherwise) will make defendants a final offer, in effect 
saying, "This is the best I can do; take it or leave it." At that point, copying the innocent defendant's 
signal serves no purpose; even guilty defendants will just ask themselves whether they are better off 
with the offer or trial. Second, even if this were not the case, guilty defendants would have a difficult 
time copying an innocent defendant's signal because they do not know what that signal is. Like 
prosecutors, guilty defendants cannot tell whether a defendant's decision to reject a plea signals 
innocence, or a preference for risk-taking-or just that the defendant cannot afford a conviction. Thus, 
while guilty defendants undoubtedly know how to protest their innocence, they do not know how to 
act like innocent defendants because they do not know who those innocent defendants are. In the end, 
then, the guilty defendant asks the same question as the innocent defendant: Am I better off with a plea 
bargain or a trial? At least at the margin, innocent and guilty defendants will answer that question 
differently-even though their different answers ar11 impossible for a prosecutor to recognize as such 
because of other, equally plausible inferences one might draw from a refusal to bargain. 
131. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 985-87 (exploring impact of sentencing differentials on 
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defendants are already more inclined to choose trial, it will take a better 
bargain to change their mind. Although the possibility of such a bargain is 
low where the chance of conviction at trial is low (recall that even factually 
guilty defendants will refuse a generous offer when they are certain of 
acquittal at trial), 132 the possibility of an offer too good for even the innocent 
defendant to refuse is much higher where the chance of conviction at trial is 
high. 133 After all, where they believe they will be convicted anyway, even 
innocent defendants will just be looking to cut their losses. 134 As a result, 
choice theory also provides an important insight as to one reason innocent 
defendants plead guilty: they are faced with an intolerably high estimate of 
the chance of conviction at trial. 135 
B. Introducing Brady 
Given our discussion thus far, Bratjy's role in protecting the accuracy of 
convictions based on a guilty pl~a seems .all too .obvious. Disclosure of 
material informa~ion favorable to ~e defense l()wers a defendant's estimate 
of the ch~ce of conviction at trial, which in turn increases the minimum 
sentencing differential necessary to make pleading guilty that defendant's 
best optio~! 36 For the innocent defendant, the effect is even more 
exaggerated, further increasing the minimuiT,l. benefit necessary to induce a 
false guilty plea. 137 Of course, disclo
1
sing · favorable information will not 
innocent defendant's willingness to plead guilty)., 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14. 
133. Moreover, the coercive influence of a high sentencing deferential is not at all dissipated by 
competent counsel. McMunigal, supra note 16, at 988-89. One can, however, at least debate the harm 
of an innocent defendant pleading guilty because the deal offered is .too good to refuse. See infra note 
134. 
134. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 34 ("[I]t is better to be an innocent person on probation than 
an innocent person in prison."); Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 1969 ("[I]t is bad 
enough to be unjustly convicted, and worse yet to be unjustly convicted and receive a sentence higher 
than one could have obtained."). Although the minimum sentencing differential required by an 
innocent defendant to plead guilty is larger than the differential required by a guilty defendant, it is 
still smaller where the chance of conviction at trial is high in comparison to where it is low. See supra 
text accompanying notes 113-14. 
135. See Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 1970 (contending that innocent 
defendants plead guilty not because of a flaw in the bargaining process, but because of flaws in the 
trial process that result in a significant risk of conviction regardless of actual innocence or guilt); 
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 311 (arguing that if the penalty of going to trial is 
high enough, even the innocent will plead guilty). · 
136. A number of commentators have recognized this point. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 14, at 
441-42; McMunigal, supra note 16, at 990-97. See also McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 933 (noting 
that overestimated chances of conviction at trial can create a substantial risk of inaccurate pleas). 
137. Because Brady disclosure lowers a defendant'sestimate of the chance of conviction at trial, it 
simultaneously makes any given plea offer less attractive, increasing even further the minimum 
sentencing differential required to make pleading guilty an innocent defendant's best option. See supra 
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prevent all innocent defendants from pleading guilty, for a sentencing 
differential could still be coercively high. 138 Nevertheless, it will at least 
prevent defendants from grossly overestimating their chance of conviction at 
trial, reducing the likelihood that innocents will plead guilty just because 
their only other option appears to be futile. 139 
Even so, choice theory suggests that Brady disclosure is essential to the 
accuracy of guilty pleas for other, though perhaps less obvious, reasons as 
well. As previously noted, some defendants (though relatively few) do not 
know whether they are innocent or guilty because of some ambiguity in the 
facts or law. 140 Here, too, Brady has a role to play, for it can remedy the 
information defects that keep these defendants from knowing their true status 
.and bargaining accordingly. 141 Admittedly, Brady's helpfulness in this regard 
is limited where the uncertainty in a defendant's status results from an 
ambiguity in the law as opposed to the facts, but even then a defendant could 
only benefit by knowing the correct facts under the law in the first place. In 
short, to the extent that defendants who know they are innocent act 
differently (at least at the margin) than those who do not, it pays in terms of 
accuracy to assist that sorting process-which is precisely what Brady 
does. 142 
Still, Brady's accuracy-enhancing effect on guilty pleas is not solely 
attributable to defendants' decision-making, for Brady influences the way 
text accompanying notes 113-14; McMunigal, supra note 16, at 991-92. 
138. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 996-97. One can, however, at least debate the harm of an 
innocent defendant pleading guilty because the deal offered is too good to refuse. See supra note 134. 
139. Importantly, this analysis does not in any way suggest that a defendant is entitled to an 
accurate assessment of the chance of conviction at trial in order to enter a valid plea, a proposition 
squarely rejected by the Supreme Court. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Rather, Brady's 
effect on a defendant's estimate of the prosecutor's case against him is relevant because it explains 
why the disclosure of Brady information promotes factually accurate pleas, a justification for 
recognizing post-guilty plea Brady claims of its own. 
140. See supra note 117 and accompanying text; McMunigal, supra note 16, at 984 (noting that a 
defendant's inability to resolve critical factual issues relevant to guilt or innocence is a limited, but 
important, subset of all guilty plea cases). 
141. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 970-84. Indeed, in the extreme, certain defendants could 
believe they are factually guilty (and bargain accordingly) only to find out later that they are not. Cases 
where Brady has served this "self-identifying" purpose are not uncommon. See. e.g., Carroll v. State, 
474 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the defendant was entitled to withdraw her guilty 
plea to vehicular homicide where she entered the plea without knowing her speed at the time of the 
accident and where the state suppressed information that defendant's speed did not contribute to 
accident); State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (holding that defendant was entitled 
to withdraw his guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter where the government suppressed eyewitness 
information establishing that accident occurred when defendant's tire had a blow-out, even though 
defendant admitted using marijuana beforehand). 
142. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 970-84 (analyzing Brady's effect on a defendant's ability 
to identify his status properly, so that his guilty plea can be relied on as an accurate reflection of 
factual guilt). 
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prosecutors do business too. Until now, we have set aside the additional costs 
associated with trial to isolate the parties' treatment of risk in the plea 
bargaining process. 143 Yet these costs provide an incentive to plea bargain as 
well, and as they increase, so does the attractiveness of pleading a case rather 
than taking it to trial. 144 For prosecutors, compliance with Brady's disclosure 
requirements is costly in time and effort. 145 Thus, unless Brady applies in the 
plea bargaining context as well as trial, the additional costs it imposes gives 
prosecutors yet another reason (aside from the risk of acquittal) to bargain 
cases with favorable evidence-and hence another reason to make a 
favorable plea offer. 146 Because Brady cases are by definition weaker to start 
with (and therefore already prone to quite lucrative plea offers), 147 limiting 
Brady to the trial context merely exacerbates the initial problem-increasing 
even further the incentive to plead guilty for those we are least certain ought 
to do so. 148 
143. See supra note 107. 
144. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
·145. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 504-05 (noting that Brady disclosure in the plea bargaining 
context would entail time and effort); Sheppard, supra note 43, at 181 (noting that compliance with 
Brady's disclosure mandate is expensive for prosecutors in terms of time). Indeed, the cost of 
complying with Brady disclosure may be one reason prosecutors in California have ·required 
defendants to explicitly waive their Brady rights before conferring plea bargaining concessions, the 
legality of which is currently before the Supreme Court. See supra note 14. 
146. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 997 ("A criminal justice system that condemns 
concealment of Brady material as a due process violation at trial, but not in plea bargaining, essentially 
encourages prosecutors to divert Brady cases. into plea bargaining."). See also supra text 
accompanying note 37 (noting moral hazard problem that results from limiting Brady to trial context). 
Ironically, Professor Douglass argues that the costs of applying Brady in the plea bargaining context 
are so significant that they provide a reason not to recognize post-plea Brady claims. See Douglass, 
supra note 14, at 505-07. It would seem, however, that disclosing Brady information prior to a guilty 
plea would still be less costly to prosecutors than going to trial-especially when other cases are 
competing for their attention and the chance of prevailing on a Brady case is comparatively small. In 
short, suppressing Brady information will not change the fact that a case is weak, so prosecutors still 
have all the incentive they need to strike a deal. Moreover, as others have argued, Brady protections 
actually promote plea bargaining by assuring defendants that they do not have to go to trial just to 
know evidence in their favor. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at I 017 ("If the Brady right were openly 
recognized as not applying in guilty plea cases ... defendants would be given an increased incentive to 
go to trial on the chance that Brady material might be forthcoming."); Note, supra note 52, at 1019 
(recognizing the symbolic importance of extending Brady protections to the plea bargaining defendant 
as an assurance of fair dealing). 
147. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 991; Sheppard, supra note 43, at 170. 
148. As Professor McMunigal rightly recognizes, suppressing Brady information during plea 
bargaining causes three factors to converge, each of which increases the possibility of convicting the 
innocent: weak cases (suggesting questionable guilt to start with), larger sentencing differentials 
(reflecting a prosecutor's eagerness to plea bargain the weak cases), and ignorance of evidence 
suggesting innocence (causing a defendant .to overestimate the ·chance of conviction at trial). See 
McMunigal, supra note 16, at 991-92. 
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C. Potential Accuracy Pitfalls ofBrady in the Plea Bargaining Context 
Although affording Brady protections to those who plead guilty will 
protect some innocent defendants, it will undoubtedly protect some guilty 
defendants too. Indeed, because we are by defmition concerned with 
defendants who have already said they are guilty once, the concern that 
Brady will mainly benefit the guilty is substantial-especially when one 
considers the potential consequences of an overturned plea. Although 
invalidating a defendant's guilty plea because of a Brady violation would 
technically only result in a new trial, the potential windfall to defendants who 
prevail on their post-guilty plea Brady claims is enormous. Retrying cases is 
not only costly for prosecutors, but difficult as well, because time. is not a 
prosecutor's friend. 149 Witnesses relocate or are no longer willing to testify, 
evidence may not have been properly preserved (or preserved at all), and the 
momentum to prosecute the case again is almost nonexistent. 150 Thus, when 
considering Brady's overall effect on the accuracy of convictions supported 
by a guilty plea, it must be conceded that affording Brady protections to the 
guilty plea defendant will, at least in some instances, result in the factually 
guilty avoiding conviction altogether. 151 
Still, Brady's propensity to protect the factually guilty is uniquely self-
limiting. As already discussed, Brady's materiality standard requires 
defendants to show a reasonable probability of innocence in order to 
establish a Brady violation at trial. 152 Assuming Brady's materiality standard 
in the plea bargaining context does the same thing, 153 the only defendants 
who would prevail on their post-plea Brady claims would be the ones we 
believe may well be innocent. As for those defendants, the possibility that 
they are guilty instead is a risk our criminal justice system mandates we take. 
As exemplified by the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden-of-proof in 
criminal trials, the core philosophy underlying our criminal justice system is 
that it is better for ten guilty defendants to go free than for an innocent 
defendant to suffer unjustly. 154 Thus, the fact that post-plea Brady claims will 
149. Although time is also not a defendant's friend, the fact that prosecutors bear the burden of 
proof at trial means that evidentiary problems arising upon remand are particularly problematic for the 
government. 
150. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 318. 
151. Given the dynamics discussed above, however, it may also just mean that the guilty will end 
up repleading to a more lenient deal. See supra Part III.A. Even that possibility, however, should be 
considered a potential downside of applying Brady in the plea bargaining context. 
152. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. 
153. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
154. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (viewing the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard as a "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to 
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on occasion protect the factually guilty as well as the factually innocent is 
hardly unacceptable; our criminal justice ethos requires no less. 155 
Setting aside the above concern, two more potential accuracy pitfalls of 
Brady in the plea bargaining context deserve consideration. In a recent 
article, Professor Douglass raises substantial concerns about Brady's ability 
to promote factually accurate guilty pleas, in part because of the effects 
Brady disclosure may have on a prosecutor's incentives. 156 The key to 
understanding Professor Douglass's point is the recognition that not all Brady 
evidence is alike. Some evidence, commonly known as "exculpatory 
evidence," favors a defendant by affirmatively establishing innocence. Other 
evidence, commonly known as "impeachment evidence," favors a defendant 
by raising doubts about the prosecutor's proof of guilt.157 Though the 
materiality standard for both types of Brady evidence is the same (in the 
guilty plea context, defendants must show that the violation affected their 
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free"). See also McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 
916-17 (concluding that the criminal justice system's concern for accuracy is essentially a one-sided 
interest in not convicting the innocent). 
ISS. Indeed, protecting the guilty is to some extent an indispensable part of protecting the 
innocent because aside from making inferences from the evidence, we simply cannot tell the two 
groups apart. See Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 1970 ("Innocent persons are accused 
not because prosecutors are wicked but because these innocents appear to be guilty.") (emphasis 
omitted); McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 922 ("It would be nearly impossible to distinguish guilty 
pleas entered by the innocent from guilty pleas entered by the guilty."). This is not to say, however, 
that the innocent and the guilty do not respond to plea bargaining differently, at least at the margin. See 
supra note 130 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is worth noting that post-guilty plea ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims raise the same concerns, but that has not kept the Supreme court from 
recognizing their legitimacy. See supra note 6. 
156. Douglass, supra note 14, at 493-99. Professor Douglass also argues that few innocent 
defendants would challenge the validity of their plea based on a Brady violation (or win, even if they 
did) because they are risk averse and received the biggest benefit from pleading guilty (due to the large 
sentencing differentials that accompany weak cases). /d. at 502. As already discussed, I disagree with 
the risk aversion assumption. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. As to the benefits 
innocent defendants likely receive, I agree that we should expect them to be substantially large, but I 
disagree that large benefits will always prevent Brady from making a difference in the innocent 
defendant's plea decisions. Granted, sometimes they will, see supra text accompanying note 138, but 
another factor causing innocent defendants to plead guilty is an intolerably high estimate of the chance 
of conviction at trial-and Brady disclosure does make a difference there. See supra text 
accompanying notes 135-39. Moreover, even defendants who reaped substantial benefits from a deal 
the first time around (whether innocent or guilty) have at least one reason to challenge their pleas 
anyway: the government may have an extremely difficult time reconstructing its case. See supra text 
accompanying note ISO. See also infra note 179 (arguing that Brady's post-plea materiality standard 
should not consider the benefit a defendant received from a plea bargain). I address Professor 
Douglass's remaining points at supra note 146, infra text accompanying notes 171-73, and infra notes 
176-77. 
157. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 494-96 (explaining the difference between "directly 
exculpatory" evidence and "impeaching" evidence). An example of exculpatory evidence is 
information about the identity or location of an alibi witness, and an example of impeachment 
evidence is the prior perjury conviction of a prosecution witness. 
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decision to plead guilty), 158 the fact that impeachment evidence is tied to the 
government's proof of guilt results in a frightening possibility: prosecutors 
can circumvent disclosure by limiting what defendants know about their 
case. 
159 Indeed, defendants who know nothing at all about the case against 
them could never meet the materiality standard for impeachment Brady 
evidence; if defendants are ignorant about the prosecutor's proof of guilt, 
how could knowledge of the impeachment information that goes with it ever 
affect their decision to plead? Thus, at least when it comes to impeachment 
evidence (which is by far the most common Brady type), 160 Professor 
Douglass is exactly right: the less defendants know, the less protection they 
get. 161 Prosecutors, then, have an incentive to withhold information, and that 
incentive is strongest in the cases they most need to plead-the ones too 
weak to win at trial. 162 
Though certainly disturbing, Professor Douglass's adverse incentive 
problem is at least limited by a number of practical restraints. As Professor 
Douglass recognizes, prosecutors have an incentive to disclose. inculpatory 
evidence despite the presence of matching impeachment information: they 
want the defendant to plead guilty. 163 Yet even if a prosecutor decided to 
stonewall in a given case, the fact that inculpatory information is routinely 
provided in other cases would create a problem of its own. Defense counsel 
are repeat players in the criminal justice system and a wary bunch by 
158. The precise showing required by the materiality standard is discussed at infra Part Ill. 
159. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 494-98. Interestingly, prosecutors in California have actually 
made the distinction between exculpatory and impeachment evidence that Professor Douglass predicts, 
contending that their Brady disclosure obligations before trial are limited to exculpatory, as opposed to 
impeachment, information. See Franklin, supra note 14, at 568-69 (discussing Brady waivers). 
160. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 494-95 (noting that most Brady evidence is impeachment 
evidence). 
161. Professor Douglass does not argue that the same problem exists for exculpatory evidence not 
tied to the government's case. /d. at 496. Moreover, Professor Douglass appears to concede that 
limiting Brady to trial would have an adverse incentive problem of its own; as the Ninth Circuit has 
recognized, it would allow prosecutors to avoid Brady disclosure altogether by pleading cases with 
Brady information. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 498; supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
. 162. As Professor Douglass rightly recognizes, prosecutors have an incentive to disclose 
weaknesses in the strongest cases (where the disclosure does not matter) and to conceal weaknesses in 
the weakest cases (where it does). /d. at 497-98. The less Brady information prosecutors disclose, the 
better their cases look-and the better their cases look, the less prosecutors must offer to induce a plea. 
Jd. Of course, if Brady applies in the plea bargaining context, the incentive problem is no problem at 
all because prosecutors then have a constitutionally-imposed duty to disclose, regardless of their own 
predilections. 
163. !d .. at 498. See also Uviller, supra note 2, at 114. On the other hand, it must be conceded that 
in some cases, disclosure of impeachment information may be so detrimental to other interests 
prosecutors may have, such as protecting the identity of cooperating witnesses, that they may still 
prefer to circumvent such disclosure by keeping certain inculpatory information to themselves. To the 
extent they do so, however, the harm is debatable. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text. 
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necessity; no doubt they would interpret a prosecutor's refusal to share 
evidence of guilt as a signal that something was seriously amiss with the 
government's case. 164 Thus, even if prosecutors tried to circumvent Brady's 
disclosure mandate for impeachment evidence by bluffing, they would not be 
very successful. Indeed, it is not entirely clear whether successfully 
circumventing Brady is even possible, for a defendant could always learn 
about inculpatory information from other sources. 165 If, for example, a 
defendant's own investigation identified government witnesses or other 
evidence with matching impeachment information, that defendant would still 
be entitled to the impeachment information despite a prosecutor's best efforts 
to conceal it. Thus, the prospect of prosecutors successfully avoiding Brady 
disclosure by refusing to share evidence of guilt is troubling, but at least 
unlikely. 166 
Nevertheless, even if prosecutors withheld inculpatory and impeachment 
evidence, the result for defendants ignorant of both is not terribly troubling. 
As previously discussed, one factor causing innocent defendants to plead 
guilty (and the factor most relevant to our analysis) is an intolerably high 
estimate of the chance of conviction at trial. 167 Yet unless they have a reason 
to conclude differently, innocent defendants are unlikely to make such high 
estimates; to the contrary, they have every reason to believe they will be 
vindicated at trial and acquitted. 168 Thus, to the extent prosecutors might 
suppress inculpatory evidence to avoid Brady disclosure of matching 
impeachment information, the harm is debatable. So long as innocent 
defendants remain ignorant of the facts falsely condemning them, they have 
no reason to plead guilty falsely and no need for information mitigating those 
falsely-condemning facts. 169 The adverse incentive problem, in short, is 
164. See Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1588 (noting that "many defense attorneys have a continuing 
relationship with prosecutors that is more reciprocal than adversarial"). 
165. From my own experience, I found that defendants often know much about a prosecutor's 
case from their own investigation, even if it is only informal. Word travels fast on the street, and 
defendants may know when former allies tum against them even before prosecutors do. 
166. A defendant may also be entitled to impeachment evidence without knowing the inculpatory 
evidence it matches if that evidence is crucial to an exculpatory evidence lead. In any event, it is 
entirely possible that prosecutors applying Brady in the plea bargaining context will not even think 
about the issues discussed above because they will continue to just ask themselves whether disclosure 
could make a difference at trial. See infra text accompanying note 230. 
167. See supra text accompanying note 135. 
168. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1939 ("Since [the defendant] knows whether he is 
innocent, he is well positioned to guard against overly high assessments of the likelihood of 
conviction."); supra text accompanying notes 118-20. 
169. Impeachment evidence is only important to the innocent defendant because it counteracts the 
coercion to plea bargain that knowledge of overwhelming inculpatory evidence creates. Thus, without 
the coercion to falsely plead guilty, the information mitigating that coercion loses its significance as 
well. 
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arguably not a problem at all because the only defendants willing to plead 
guilty without knowing the evidence against them most likely know 
something we do not: they committed the crime. 170 
Recognizing the latter point is also essential in addressing another 
perceived accuracy pitfall of Brady's application in the plea bargaining 
context: its inability to provide the information necessary. for a defendant to 
engage in fully informed decision-making about a plea. Admittedly, Brady 
disclosure only provides defendants with half of the information they need to 
accurately assess their chance of conviction at trial, revealing the weaknesses 
in a prosecutor's case but never the strengths. 171 Again, however, innocent 
defendants ignorant of inculpatory evidence are unlikely to plead guilty 
falsely on that account; they view the unknowns in a prosecutor's case 
optimistically because they know they are in fact innocent. 172 Thus, while 
innocent defendants may overestimate the chance of conviction at trial 
because they know about inculpatory evidence but not exculpatory or 
impeaching evidence, their ignorance of inculpatory evidence . alone is 
unlikely to have the same affect. In sum, when it comes to the strengths in a 
prosecutor's case (at least during plea bargaining), what innocent defendants 
do not know will not hurt them. 173 · 
Given these considerations, it would appear that Brady's role in securing 
accurate convictions is just as essential in the plea bargaining context as it is 
at trial. That being the case, doctrinally justifying post-plea Brady claims is 
not so difficult after all; like the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Brady is 
simply too important a protection for the innocent to limit its application· to 
170. For the same reason, the fact that defendants often plea bargain early, before .either party h~s 
much information, is of limited concern. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 455-56 & n.75 (noting that 
the earliest pleas are most valuable to the parties but made on the least amount of information). The 
very fact that these defendants are willing to plead guilty in the dark should tell us that they are 
predicting the outcome at trial based in part on information of their own-i.e., their private knowledge 
of guilt or innocence. 
171. As Professor Douglass explains, "Brady may suggest some 'melting' around the edges of the 
government's case, but it will not expose the iceberg that the defendant may face at trial." Douglass, 
supra note 14, at 453. Nor will Brady require disclosure ofnonevidentiary information relevant to the 
strength of a prosecutor's case, such as the fact that a witness hl:ls died. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 44 
N.Y.2d 76, 82 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978). See also David Aaron, Note, Ethics, Law 
Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67 
FORDHAM L. REv. 3005, 3006-07 (1999) (explaining that Brady does not require disclosure of 
nonevidentiary facts because knowledge of such facts would not prevent factually inaccurate 
convictions). 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19. 
173. The same cannot be said for factually guilty defendants, but there is no harm in factually 
guilty defendants pleading guilty-even if oniy because they overestimated their chance of conviction 
at trial. 
2002] ACCURACY WHERE IT MATTERS 37 
tria1. 174 To conclude that Brady is necessary to secure accurate convictions 
based on a guilty plea, however, is not to say that courts recognizing post-
guilty plea Brady claims have exhausted the doctrine's full potential in that 
regard. As Professor Douglass rightly recognizes, post-plea Brady claims are 
rarely successful because defendants can rarely' meet Brady's materiality 
standard after a plea.175 While practical problems such as the absence of a 
trial record are partly to blame for this difficulty, 176 I argue in Part III that the 
most serious problem is more innate: the materiality standard currently used 
to judge post-guilty plea Brady claims is itself too onerous. 177 
174. Supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text This is not to suggest, however, that Brady rights are 
therefore inalienable; that is a different question altogether. See supra note 14. 
175. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 479 & n.l84 (noting that post-guilty plea Brady claims are 
"an exercise in futility for most defendants" and listing several dozen cases where the reviewing court 
refused to find a post-guilty plea Brady claim material); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship 
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. I, 61 n.204 (1997) (noting that 
cases overturning guilty pleas based on a Brady violation are almost nonexistent); Franklin, supra note 
14, at 590 & n.156 (noting that in only two of several dozen post-guilty plea Brady cases a defendant 
succeeded in meeting the materiality standard !lnd listing those findings). In my own search of over 
one hundred state and federal post-guilty plea Brady cases, I found only a dozen of instances when a 
defendant prevailed on his claim. See, e.g., Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1324 (2d Cir. 1988); 
Lewis v. United States, 985 F. Supp. 654, 658 (S.D. W. Va. 1997); Banks v. United States, 920 F. 
Supp. 688, 69~ (E.D. Va. 1996); United States v. Millan-Colon, 829 F. Supp. 620, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993); Carroli v. State~ 474 S.E.2d 737, 740 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144, 
I I 53 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); State v. Johnson, 544 So.2d 767, 773 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Lee v. State, 
573 S.W.2d 131, 134-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Parsons, 775 A.2d 576,581-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2001); People v. Curry, 6.27 N.Y.S.2d 214,216 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Gibson v. State, 514 
S.E.2d 3.20 (S.C. 1999); Ex parte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); State v. 
Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 589, 598 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). In almost every one of those cases, the evidence 
of actual innocence is exceptionally strong. See infra note 198. 
176.. Douglass, supra note 14, at 480. While I agree with Professor Douglass that the absence of a 
trial record makes applying Brady in the plea bargaining context more difficult, the same difficulty has 
not made post-guilty plea Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims unworkable. In 
both cases, courts considering a post-plea claim conduct evidentiary hearings on the issue, considering 
factors such as the factual basis supporting a· defendant's plea, records of formal discovery, and 
preliminary hearing testimony. Still, to the extent defendants making a post-plea Brady claim are 
disadvantaged from the start, we have yet another reason to ensure Brady's materiality standard in the 
plea bargaining context is not unduly harsh, the topic of infra Part Ill. See Sheppard, supra note 43, at 
I 78 (arguing that Brady's materiality standard should be lower in cases where a defendant's 
conviction rests upon a guilty plea because neither side has had the opportunity to present evidence). 
177. I must concede that another problem with Brady's application in the plea bargaining context 
is equally problematic: its prospective duty to disclose information that can only retrospectively be 
defined. This problem, however, is identical to the definitional problem accompanying Brady's 
application at trial. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 699-705 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (lamenting the inherent difficulty in applying prior to trial a definition of materiality that 
turns on the outcome at trial). Moreover, it is entirely unclear whether definitional ambiguity in 
Brady's duty to disclose is a good thing or bad. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439-40 (1995) 
(noting that uncertainty in Brady's duty to disclose will encourage prosecutors to resolve doubtful 
questions in favor of disclosure). 
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III. USING ACCURACY INTERESTS TO DEFINE MATERIALITY IN THE PLEA 
BARGAINING CONTEXT 
Because accuracy interests provide the strongest doctrinal and normative 
justification for applying Brady in the plea-bargaining context, it ma,kes 
sense to look to those same interests as a guide in fashioning a materiality 
standard best suited for post-guilty plea Brady claims. As mentioned early in 
Part II, Brady's accuracy-enhancing effect on guilty pleas is maximized 
when the materiality standard for post-plea Brady claims does just what 
Brady's materiality standard does at trial, overturning a conviction whenever 
our confidence in a defendant's guilt is seriously shaken. 178 Thus, the ideal 
materiality standard for post-guilty plea Brady claims translates into the 
guilty plea context a defendant's required showing at trial-that with Brady 
disclosure, there is "a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the 
proceeding would have been different."179 · 
Adapting Brady's materiality standard at trial to the guilty plea context, 
courts have thus 'far unanimously required·defendants to show a reasonable 
probability that with Brady disclosure, they would have insisted upon going 
to trial. 180 Given the current doctrinal landscape, this . result is hardly 
I 78. See supra notes I 00-0 I and accompanying text. 
179. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). See also text accompanying supra note 
98. Recognizing what Brady's post-plea materiality standard should require is essential to answering 
one last point made by Professor Douglass. See supra text accompanying note I 56. As Professor 
Douglass recognizes, we can expect innocent defendants to have the weakest cases and so we can also 
expect them to receive the most benefit from pleading guilty; they demand a larger sentencing 
differential (because they are innocent) arid prosecutors are willing to give it {because they will likely 
lose at trial). Douglass, supra note I 4, at 486c87. That being the case, Professor Douglass is right that 
innocent defendants will find it most difficult to prevail on post-plea claims-at least when courts (like 
the Eight Circuit) consider the benefit a defendant received in pleading guilty. See supra note 44. 
Concededly, if courts consider the benefits a defendant received in pleading guilty when determining 
whether suppressed favorable information is material, Brady violations will be the most difficult to 
prove in the weakest cases. The Supreme Court, however, has told us that Brady violations should be 
easiest to prove in the weakest 'cases; if the evidence against a defendant is already questionable, it will 
take less Brady evidence to show that the result of the proceeding may well have been different. See 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, I 12-13 (1976) (admonishing courts to evaluate the materiality of 
suppressed favorable evidence in light of other incriminating evidence supporting a defendant's 
conviction). It would appear, then, that considering the benefit a defendant received from a plea will 
consistently lead us to the wrong result, and that therefore courts should not do it. Still, the 
phenomenon bolsters the point of this section-that when defining materiality for post-plea Brady 
claims, it is crucial to remain focused on what Brady's materiality standard does at trial, reversing a 
defendant's conviction whenever Brady information creates a reasonable probability of innocence. 
180. See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 269.F.3d 1207, 1214-15 (lOth Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Avellino, 136 F.3d 249,261-62 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 
1995); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 424 (8th Cir. 1988); Indelicato v. United States, 106 F. 
Supp. 2d 151, 158 (D. Mass. 2000); State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144, 1152 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); 
State v. Parsons, 775 A.2d 576, 580-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 
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surprising. In 1985, the Supreme Court in Hill v. Lockhart181 adopted the 
"insist upon trial" standard as the prejudice showing necessary to establish a 
post-guilty plea ineffective assistance of counsel claim.182 Because Brady's 
materiality standard at trial was borrowed from the prejudice prong for 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims at trial, 183 the most obvious 
materiality standard for post-guilty plea Brady claims is the prejudice 
standard adopted in Hill. In theory, Hill's prejudice standard is less than ideal 
for post-plea Brady claims because the government plays a role in bringing 
Brady violations about, a fact the Supreme Court has previously found 
significant.184 Still, the Court has ignored this difference between the claims 
in the trial context, so it is hard to imagine why the two standards should 
differ in claims made after a plea. As a doctrinal matter, then, the "insist upon 
trial" materiality standard currently used to judge post-guilty plea Brady 
claims can be considered a foregone conclusion. 
Nevertheless, while going to trial· may be one way a guilty plea 
proceeding's result could be different; it is not the only way. Clearly, the 
result would also be different if Brady disclosure caused a defendant to reject 
a particular bargain and strike a ·better· deal. Although a number of 
commentators have recognized that Brady disclosure may just lead to a better 
bargain for some defendants, 185 none have considered this possibility in the 
context of identifying the proper materiality standard for post-guilty plea 
320,325 (S.C. 1999); State v. Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 589, 596 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). 
181.- 474 u.s. 52 (1985). . ' 
182. !d. at 59. 
183. See United States v .. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (borrowing from the prejudice 
standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Interestingly, the test 
announced in Strickland for establishing prejudice. was, in tum, based on one of three materiality 
standards employed in a previous Brady case, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (selecting the appropriate test for prejudice and citing Agurs). 
184. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at Ill (noting that Brady's materiality standard reflects the fact that the 
government is responsible for Brady violations). Paradoxically, the Supreme Court in both Hill and 
Strickland justified adopting the same showing as the prejudice standard for ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims by stating that "[t]he government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, 
attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; 
Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (quoting Strickland). 
185. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 489 n.224 ("Indeed, the likely result of a successful post-
conviction Brady claim is a guilty plea by the same defendant with an agreement for a reduced 
sentence."); Franklin, supra note 14, at 591 (noting that impeachment information will unlikely cause 
defendants to go trial; most will simply sign a better plea agreement); Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1617 
(noting that undisclosed information most likely affects the terms of the plea agreement). See also 
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 271 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that if the defendant 
had recognized the potential constitutional violation, he might have been able to secure a more 
favorable bargain); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1958 (arguing that most attorney error in the plea 
bargaining context is not constitutionally cognizable because it affects the price of a plea rather than its 
existence). 
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Brady claims. Perhaps, however, we should. After all, Brady's materiality 
standard at trial only requires defendants to show a reasonable probability 
that the result of the proceeding would have been different; 186 it does not 
require them to show how. Though the point is hardly worth mentioning at 
the guilt phase of trial, where the only alternative to a conviction is acquittal, 
it has much more force at the sentencing phase of trial-and Brady applies 
there too. 187 Thus, the most comparable post-plea materiality standard to 
Brady's materiality standard at trial only requires defendants to show that a 
particular plea would not have occurred, regardless of what else would have. 
In short, it requires defendants to show a reasonable probability that with 
Brady disclosure, they would have rejected the plea they in fact took. 188 Not 
surprisingly, the difference between the "reject the plea" and "insist upon 
trial" materiality standards is palpable, 189 and that difference has accuracy 
implications of its own. To see why, we return to the plea bargaining 
defendant's decision-making dynamics, extending the analysis modeled 
above. 
A. The "Insist Upon Trial" Materiality Standard. 
The "insist upon trial" materiality standard for post-plea Brady claims is 
based on the assumption that where Brady disclosure creates a reasonable 
probability of a different result at trial, defendants will insist upon resolving 
186. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
187. Thus, where a defendant's Brady claim challenges the sentence received at trial (as did the 
claim in Brady itself), see supra note 99, the defendant need only show a reasonable probability that 
with Brady disclosure, the sentence would have been different. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 
89-90 ( 1963 ). Because plea bargaining creates a particular outcome as to guilt and punishment at once, 
it is even more apparent that the materiality standard for post-plea Brady claims should only require 
defendants to show that they would not have agreed to the bargain they in fact took. 
188. Although this showing also means that defendants would have insisted upon trial in lieu of 
that particular plea, there is no indication that courts using the "insist upon trial" materiality standard 
really have the "reject the plea" showing in mind. See, e.g., Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 ("[T]he defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.") (emphasis added); Sanchez v. United 
States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he issue in a case involving a guilty plea is whether 
there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to disclose the Brady material, the defendant 
would have refused to plead and would have gone to trial.") (emphasis added). In any event, equating 
the two standards is unrealistic because it fails to account for the possibility that the parties will 
continue to bargain and reach agreement on a different deal. See infra text accompanying notes 212-13 
(recognizing continuing incentives for parties to bargain). 
189. Put in most stark terms, the "insist upon trial" materiality standard asks what a defendant 
would have done, while the "reject the plea" materiality standard asks what a defendant would not 
have done. Again, the "reject the plea" standard would only require defendants to show that they 
would not have pleaded guilty to the terms they in fact pleaded guilty to. Thus, it would not require 
them to show that they would have--or even could have-struck a better deal with the government. 
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their charges there. 190 That being the case, the "insist upon trial" materiality 
standard purports to mirror Brady's materiality standard at trial, reversing a 
conviction whenever a reasonable probability exists that the defendant may 
be innocent. 191 The idea, in short, is that if defendants are truly innocent, they 
will use Brady disclosure to assert their innocence at trial. 
Considering the "insist upon trial" materiality standard in light of the plea 
bargaining defendant's decision-making dynamics discussed above is both 
feasible and illuminating, but using our model requires an extra logical step. 
At least at first glance, the model previously employed does not account for 
an "insist upon trial" option; it only presents a defendant's decision-making 
calculus with regards to a particular plea. To say that a defendant would 
insist upon trial, however, is just another way of saying that the defendant 
would prefer trial to any plea. 192 In other words, the defendant who would 
insist upon trial is one who would choose trial over each and every offer a 
prosecutor might conceivably make. That being the case, the showing 
required by the "insist upon trial" materiality standard is not so difficult to 
model after all: we just need to identify the point at which there is no 
sentencing differential high enough to make pleading guilty a defendant's 
best option. 
Given what we already know about the plea bargaining defendant's 
decision-making dynamics, finding the point at which defendants "insist 
upon trial" (albeit imprecisely) is not difficult. As previously discussed, a 
defendant's estimated chance of conviction at trial determines the size of the 
sentencing differential needed to make pleading guilty that defendant's best 
option.193 The lower the chance of conviction at trial, the higher the 
differential must be-and this is true regardless of a defendant's factual guilt. 
At some point, of course, the chance of conviction at trial will be so low that 
even an exceptionally large differential could not force a. plea; again, to the 
extent defendants are certain they will be acquitted at trial, they will reject 
even the sweetest of deals. 194 At every other point, however, even the 
innocent defendant has an incentive to plead guilty, if the price is right. 195 
190. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Hill v. Lockhart made this point explicitly, explaining that a 
defendant's ability to meet the "insist upon trial" prejudice standard for post-guilty plea ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims depended largely on whether the violation would have changed the 
outcome at trial, had the defendant chosen trial in the first place. Hill, 474 U.S. at 60. 
191. See supra notes 98-1 00 and accompanying text. 
192. Seen in this way, a defendant's decision to insist upon trial is actually a number of decisions 
rejecting every plea bargain that might be otherwise made. 
193. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. 
195. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. 
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That price will be higher than the guilty defendant's minimum demand, and 
prosecutors may not be willing (or able) to pay ie96-but it exists. Thus, 
although the particular point at which a defendant would reject every deal is 
impossible to define with precision, and although that point will come earlier 
for defendants who are innocent than those who are guilty (the latter being 
more willing to plea bargain to start with), our model at least tells us its 
general location: where the chance of conviction at trial is exceedingly 
low.I97 
Given that realization, the problem with using the "insist upon trial" 
materiality standard to judge post-guilty plea Brady claims becomes clear: 
defendants can only meet it where the suppressed Brady evidence is strong 
enough to plummet the chance of conviction at trial. Indeed, in practice, the 
result is just what our model predicts; only where the suppressed Brady 
evidence is strong enough to make acquittal at trial inevitable are courts 
willing to invalidate a defendant's plea. 198 Whenever Brady evidence is that 
196. A prosecutor's ability to make the low-ball offers necessary to induce innocent defendants to 
plead guilty is limited to some extent by external constraints such as office policy or political 
pressures. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra· note 3, at 299 (recognizing that prosecutors are 
responsible to superiors and public). In addition, prosecutors are making the same cost-benefit 
assessments that defendants are, so if the offer necessary to induce .a plea is too lenient, prosecutors 
may well determine that they could do better at trial regardless of its attendant costs and risks. See 
supra notes I 06-10 and accompanying text. 
197. Even when the chance of conviction is exceedingly low, pleading guilty may be a 
defendant's best option if the consequences of a conviction at trial are.intolerable. An obvious example 
is where a defendant faces the death penalty if convicted at trial, precisely the Circumstances at issue in 
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 55-58 (discussing the 
facts of Brady v. United States). 
198. See, e.g., Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1322-24 (2d Cir. 1998) (setting aside 
defendant's plea where prosecutor suppressed information indicating that another person committed 
the offenses); Lewis v. United States, 985 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (setting aside 
defendant's plea-based conviction for mail fraud where prosecutor suppressed information showing 
defendant never used the United States Postal Service to deliver the fraudulent document); Carroll v. 
State, 474 S.E.2d 737, 740 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the defendant was entitled to withdraw a 
guilty plea to vehicular homicide where prosecutor suppressed information tending to show that road 
conditions contributed to the accident and that the state could not determine the defendant's speed); 
State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the defendant was entitled to 
withdraw a vehicular manslaughter plea where prosecutor suppressed eyewitness testimony that 
victim's death was caused by a tire blowout and not the defendant's fatigue or drug use); State v. 
Johnson, 544 So. 2d 767, 773 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (determining that the defendant's guilty plea to 
distribution of marijuana was invalid where prosecutor suppressed alibi information); Lee v. State, 573 
S.W.2d 131, 133-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (determining that the defendant was entitled to withdraw a 
guilty plea where prosecutor suppressed evidence that victim made a false identification in the photo 
lineup and was shown a picture of defendant before identifying the defendant in person); People v. 
Curry, 627 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215-16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding that the defendant was entitled to 
withdraw a guilty plea to possession of controlled substance where the prosecutor suppressed 
videotaped evidence of a police officer shaking down drug dealers, stealing their money, and selling 
stolen drugs); Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320, 325-26 (S.C. 1999) (holding that the defendant's 
manslaughter plea must be set aside where prosecutor suppressed information tending to show that a 
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strong, however, prosecutors will most likely lack the authority and 
inclination to pursue a conviction in the first place. After all, a defendant's 
charge must at least be supported by probable cause, 199 and already 
overburdened prosecutors have little incentive to devote their time and 
attention to a loser case. 200 Thus, for charges that are prosecuted at all, the 
chance of conviction at trial will almost always be a real enough possibility 
for defendants to conclude that at some point, a plea bargain is their best 
option. In short, choice theory tells us (and reality confirms) that the 
defendant who would insist upon trial with Brady disclosure is truly rare 
because cases where suppressed Brady evidence is that strong seldom 
exist.201 
Practicalities aside, the "insist upon trial" materiality standard . is also 
problematic because it results in defendants having to prove their innocence. 
Assuming (as we must) that trial provides a reasonably accurate means of 
determining a defendant's guilt, the chance of acquittal at trial corresponds to 
the chance we believe a defendant may be innocent.202 That being the case, 
requiring defendants to show a small chance of conviction at trial equates to 
requiring them to show a small chance of factual guilt, which is just another 
way of saying that defendants must establish they are probably not guilty. 
Thus, while the "insist upon trial" materiality standard purports to reverse a 
conviction whenever Brady evidence creates a "reasonable probability" of 
innocence (as does Brady's materiality standard at trial)/03 in fact it is much 
more demanding. 204 
In part, forcing guilty plea defendants to show they are probably not 
guilty is troubling because it conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. As the 
key eyewitness could not possibly have seen what she was expected to testify to at trial); Ex part~ 
Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (holding that the defendant's guilty plea was 
invalid where prosecutor suppressed information tending to show that the defendant was incompetent 
to stand trial and insane at the time of the offense). See also supra note 175. 
199. See U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
200. Prosecutorial resources are limited. and already overtaxed, which is part of the reason 
prosecutors bargain in the first place. See supra note I 05. 
201. This is not to say that such cases never exist. As Professor McMunigal recognizes, the very 
existence of Brady cases shows that some charges are nevertheless prosecuted. See McMunigal, supra 
note 16, at 993-94 (noting. countervailing factors that may incline a prosecutor to pursue particularly 
weak cases, such as a defendant's bad record or other criminal activity). 
202. We can never truly know' ~heiher a defendant is factually guilty or innocent, so the only 
benchmark we can use is the anticipated result of trial. At trial, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
burden of proof tells us that defendants should be acquitted when we believe they may be innocent. 
Hence, discussing the chance of acquittal at trial is just a proxy for discussing the chance we believe a 
defendant may be innocent. 
203. See supra notes 98-1 00 and accompanying text. 
204. One could, of course, argue that the insist upon trial materiality standard should be more 
demanding, a point considered infra text accompanying notes 215-24. 
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Court has recently explained, a "reasonable probability:' of a different result 
at trial does not mean the result there would probably have been different.205 
To a large extent, however, the trouble with forcing guilty plea defendants to 
show they are probably not guilty is more fundamental, implicating the 
accuracy interests that Brady is designed to promote. Clearly, the "insist 
upon trial" materiality standard will protect defendants who are obviously 
innocent (or at least enough like the innocent to warrant treating them as 
such). For defendants who may well be innocent, however, the "insist upon 
trial" standard will offer no protection at all. Again, as long as the chance of 
conviction at trial remains a real possibility, even innocent defendants will 
not find themselves in the enviable position of being able to insist upon trial 
at any cost. Thus, while the "insist upon trial" materiality standard is 
effective in protecting only the innocent, it does not protect them enough. 
That being the case, the "insist upon trial" standard is an inappropriate choice 
for maximizing the accuracy-enhancing potential that justifies Brady's 
application in the plea bargaining context in the first place. 
B. The "Reject the Plea " Materiality Standard 
Although the above analysis concluded that Brady disclosure will seldom 
cause a defendant to insist upon trial, the likelihood that disclosure will cause 
a defendant to reject a particular plea remains to be determined. Before 
turning to that issue, however, a point of clarification is in order. When 
asking whether Brady disclosure would have led a defendant to reject a plea 
(or at least whether it would have had a reasonable probability of doing so), 
the question is not whether disclosure after the fact would cause a defendant 
to want a better deal (surely it would), but rather whether disclosure 
beforehand would cause a defendant to want a better deal before agreeing to 
plead guilty. The analysis, then, is prospective in nature and focused on only 
one plea bargain, the one the defendant actually took. 
From the analysis thus far, we know that Brady's effect on a defendant's 
decision to accept or reject a particular plea depends on the extent to which it 
lowers the estimated chance of conviction at trial.206 By lowering the chance 
of conviction at trial, Brady· disclosure increases the minimum sentencing 
differential (i.e., the minimum discount in punishment) needed to make 
pleading guilty a defendant's best option. Whether that new differential is 
substantial enough to affect a defendant's decision-making with regards to a 
particular plea depends on the strength of the Brady information itself. In 
205. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995). 
206. See supra text accompanying note 136. 
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short, Brady disclosure will undoubtedly ·reduce the attractiveness of any 
given plea offer; the question is whether that plea offer is still attractive 
enough. 
Sometimes Brady disclosure will lower the chance of conviction at trial 
(and hence raise a defendant's sentencing differential demand) only slightly 
so that a particular plea offer is still a good deal for a defendant, though not 
as good a deal as it was before.207 Defendants finding themselves in this 
situation would take the plea anyway and hence would not meet the "reject 
the plea" materiality standard-exactly the result we want where Brady 
information is too weak to significantly affect the probability that a defendant 
would be convicted at trial.208 Other times, however, Brady information will 
be stronger, lowering the chance of conviction at trial enough to affect a 
defendant's willingness to take a particular plea?09 Although it is impossible 
to precisely identify this point (and in any event it would be different for 
innocent and guilty defendants),210 it is unlikely that any defendant would be 
willing to accept the same deal originally pleaded to where Brady disclosure 
created a reasonable probability of acquittal at trial. After all, if Brady 
information is strong enough to suggest that a defendant may be innocent, a 
plea offer would have to account for that fact-and more--to remain that 
defendant's best option.211 
207. The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998), 
provides such an example. In Avellino, the court held that the government's suppression of a perjury 
conviction against one of its witnesses was not material where that witness had "an atrocious criminal 
record" of which the defendant was aware, including convictions for high-jacking, burglary, arson, and 
murder. See id. at 258. 
208. Under these circumstances, the term "Brady information" is technically inappropriate 
because if information favorable to the defense is not material, it is by definition not Brady 
information at all. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,281 (1999) (recognizing the distinction). 
209. The strength of the Brady information necessary to affect a defendant's willingness to tRke a 
particular plea will depend on the other evidence against a defendant. If that evidence is weak, for 
example, then even relatively weak Brady information could affect the attractiveness of a given plea; if 
the evidence in a prosecutor's case is otherwise strong, however, the Brady information will need to be 
stronger to have the same effect. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976) (noting that 
materiality assessment should consider other evidence supporting a defendant's guilt). See also supra 
note 179 (discussing application of Agurs in plea bargaining context). 
210. Recall that innocent and guilty defendants have different plea bargaining proclivities. See 
supra text accompanying notes 117-21. 
211. Theoretically, it is possible for Brady disclosure to create a reasonable probability of 
acquittal at trial but not affect a defendant's plea decision. However, this result is only possible where 
prosecutors make offers much more lenient than defendants without Brady information would demand, 
and there is no reason to believe they would be so .felicitous. Because of the large percentage of cases 
that are plea bargained, see supra note 2, prosecutors are negotiators as much as they are trial lawyers. 
Thus, prosecutors are well versed in the art of getting the most-as opposed to the least-punishment 
possible out of a given plea bargaining situation. 
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To conclude that Brady disclosure may in.some instances lead defendants 
to reject a particular plea, however, is not to say that in those instances they 
would necessarily insist upon trial. Whether defendants would actually insist 
upon trial in light of newly-disclosed Brady evidence depends on the extent 
to which Brady disclosure lowers the chance of conviction at trial. Under the 
"reject the plea" standard, the chance of conviction at trial need not be so low 
that defendants would reject every plea; it just has to be low enough for 
defendants to reject the one they in fact pleaded to. Of course, the stronger 
the Brady evidence, the more likely it would be to have both effects, but the 
"reject the plea" standard would not require that result. Given practical 
considerations, the distinction is significant. If incentives to plea bargain exist 
at (nearly) every turn as I have argued,212 there is every reason to believe that 
after Brady disclosure, the parties could still make themselves better off by 
striking a deal. Again, the cases that prosecutors most want to deal are the 
weak ones they believe they would lose at trial.213 Thus, when a particular 
offer will not meet a defendant's sentencing differential demand because of 
Brady disclosure, a prosecutor has every reason to make another offer that 
will. In reality, then, Brady disclosure might reduce the chance of conviction 
at trial enough for a defendant to insist upon trial in a few cases, but more 
often it will just affect the terms of the bargain struck.214 
Clearly, the "reject the plea" materiality standard is less demanding than 
the "insist upon trial" materiality standard. That ·difference, in fact, is the 
reason the "reject the plea" standard best matches Brady's materiality 
standard at trial.215 Even so, it is worth considering whether Brady's 
materiality standard in the plea bar~aining context should be higher than the 
materiality standard used at trial.21 After all, defendants raising post-guilty 
plea Brady claims have, by defmition, already said they are guilty once, and 
those being honest about that fact would also fmd the "reject the plea" 
212. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra text accompanying note I 06. 
214. See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1984 (contending that lowering information barriers will not 
keep innocent defendants from pleading guilty). Annecdotal evidence supports this conclusion. See, 
e.g., United States v. James, 960 F.2d 147, 1992 WL 80318, at *I (4th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table 
decision) (considering the defendant's argument that had he received Brady information, he may have 
been able to negotiate a more favorable plea agreement); Mustread v. Gilmore, 966 F.2d 1148, 1152 
(7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the defendant already knew that the victim was changing her story and 
used that information to negotiate a plea to a lesser charge). See also supra note 185; infra note 226. 
215. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100,210-1 I. 
216. The higher "insist upon trial" standard could be seen as a concession for recognizing post-
guilty plea Brady claims in the first place-a way to protect the finality of guilty pleas and the 
obviously innocent guilty plea defendant too. It merits noting, however, that courts using the "insist 
upon trial" standard do not justify it in this manner. Rather, they see the standard as comporting with 
the materiality standard used for Brady claims at trial. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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standard easier to meet Given the potential windfall to guilty defendants who 
prevail on their post-plea· Brady claims,217 one might well conclude that 
when a defendant has pleaded guilty, who cares if the government gets a 
better deal than it would have had Brady disclosure been made?218 
Framing the question this way, however, misses the point. The virtue of 
the "reject the plea" standard is not that it keeps the government from striking 
a particularly favorable deal, but that it allows .us to be confident in the 
accuracy of a defendant's plea.219 That confidence is only possible if the 
materiality standard for post-plea Brady claims reverses a conviction 
whenever our confidence in a defendant's guilt is seriously shaken-i.e., 
whenever a defendant shows a reasonable probability that Brady disclosure 
would have resulted in an acquittal ·at trial. 220 As discussed above, only the 
"reject the plea" standard· achieves this result;221 the "insist upon trial" 
standard is too demanding. 222 That being the case, the fact that a defendant 
might ultimately choose to use Brady disclosure to strike another, more 
favorable deal, is irrelevant; if pleading guilty (again) makes innocent 
defendants better off, we should fully support that result. 223 As for the 
factually guilty defendants who will also benefit from the lower "reject the 
plea" standard, we should consider them the inevitable byproduct of our core 
criminal justice philosophy-that adequate protection of the innocent is 
worth some unintended protection of the guilty as well.224 
As a practical matter, however, we can be only minimally disturbed about 
the idea of defendants using an established Brady claim to negotiate a 
favorable plea because they do that now. Defendants who win on a post-trial 
Brady claim get a new trial, but nothing stops them from striking a deal on 
remand instead225-artd that is exactly what some defendants do.226 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 1 50-S 1. 
218. Given the fact that public opinion thinks plea'bargaining results in dispositions that are too 
lax, see Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1909 n.4, the point has even more force. 
219. One might also answer that it is fundamentally unfair to hold anyone to a bargain-at least 
one that results in the deprivation of liberty-that they did not really mean to make. Contract theory 
would support this position. See Scott & Stuntz,' supra note 2, at 1957-60 (applying the contract notion 
of unilateral mistake to the plea bargaining context); Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1609-10 (considering 
the contract law doctrines of mistake and duress in making a case for pre-plea disclosure). This 
explanation, however, brings us back to the notion of a truly consensual (i.e., voluntary and intelligent) 
plea, which the Supreme Court has not found necessary to sustain a plea-based conviction. See supra 
text accompanying notes 38-39. 
220. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra note 134. 
224. See supra notes 1 54-SS and accompanying text. 
225. Technically, there is no right to plead guilty, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 
n.11 (1970), so a court on remand could simply refuse to accept the defendant's guilty plea, thereby 
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Similarly, defendants who win on a post-plea Brady claim have no obligation 
to insist upon trial as the materiality standard currently used suggests ·they 
will, assuming on remand that the government is even interested in re-
prosecuting the case.227 Given these considerations, at least the "reject the 
plea" materiality standard is realistic in accounting for the fact that plea 
bargaining can make a defendant (even if innocent) better off, matching the 
materiality requirement for post-plea Brady claims with the remedy 
defendants prevailing on those claims would actually receive. 228 Because the 
whole point of Brady's materiality standard is to tell us when the problem of 
suppressed favorable evidence is serious enough to remedy, harmonizing the 
two concepts is, under any scenario, the clearly preferable choice. 229 
In all fairness, it may not matter to prosecutors which materiality standard 
courts choose to judge post-guilty plea Brady claims. Because they are well-
practiced in complying with Brady at trial, prosecutors may just continue to 
ask themselves whether disclosing certain information could have made a 
difference there.23° For the defendant who asserts a post-guilty plea Brady 
claim, however, the difference is an important one, and that difference has 
equally important implications for the accuracy of convictions supported by a 
forcing a trial. As a practical matter, though, courts have no reason to do that; their the over-crowded 
trial docket makes resolving cases by plea bargain just as attractive to judges as it is to the parties 
themselves. See Sheppard, supra note 43, at 172. 
226. Unfortunately, there appears to be no information as to what percentage of Brady violations 
following trial (or a plea, for that matter) ultimately result in guilty pleas. There is, however, anecdotal 
evidence that it happens. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 856 F. Supp. 1293, 1294 (N.D. Ill. 1994) 
(noting that the government entered into plea agreements with the defendants after their trial 
convictions were overturned due to Brady violations). Given the added costs and uncertainties of a 
trial on remand, see supra note 150 and accompanying text, the incentives to plea bargain Brady cases 
the second time around are considerable, suggesting that the practice occurs more often than the cases 
might indicate. See supra notes I 04-06 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. I have found no case forcing a defendant who 
can meet the "insist upon trial" materiality standard to actually do so on remand, and the same 
practical considerations that would prevent a judge from forcing a trial on remand after a trial-based 
conviction is reversed would apply when a conviction that rests on a plea is reversed. See supra note 
225. See also supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text (discussing incentives to plea bargain even 
after Brady disclosure has been made). 
228. Invalidating a defendant's conviction based on a plea negates both the conviction and the 
plea so that defendants on remand are in their pre-plea positions-exactly where they would be if they 
had rejected the plea they actually pleaded to. 
229. Thus, if we really believe the "insist upon trial" materiality standard is appropriate for post-
plea Brady claims, we should force defendants on remand to either stick with the original plea or take 
their case to trial. Doing so, however, would prevent the parties from making themselves better off, a 
result that may be particularly harsh for the government. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
230. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 494 (noting that in the pretrial context, many prosecutors just 
ask whether the information is favorable to the defendant). After all, until a defendant actually pleads 
guilty, a prosecutor cannot entirely rule out the possibility of going to trial. See supra note 28 and 
accompanying text. 
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plea. Of course, even if Brady's post-plea materiality standard is destined to 
require defendants to show they would have insisted upon trial, all is not lost; 
even limited protection is better than none.231 Still, it is important to 
recognize that, were we writing on a clean slate, the "insist upon trial" 
standard is not the ideal choice for maximizing the accuracy interests that 
justify Brady's application in the plea bargaining context in the first place. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Using modern choice theory to examine the plea bargaining defendant's 
decision-making dynamics elucidates at least two truths. First, innocent 
defendants sometimes plead guilty even though they could contest their guilt 
at trial, and they do so because pleading guilty is in their best interest. 
Second, Brady plays a crucial role in preventing guilty pleas by innocent 
defendants, just as Brady plays a crucial role in preventing the conviction of 
innocent defendants at trial. Should the Supreme Court ultimately recognize 
these truths, however, it will not likely choose a materiality standard for post-
guilty plea Brady claims that maximizes Brady's accuracy-enhancing 
potential. Assuming doctrinal consistency would lead the Court to employ 
Hill v. Lockhart's "insist upon trial" standard instead, post-plea Brady claims 
will continue to provide little more than illusory protection for the plea 
bargaining defendant. 
Protecting the defendant who plea bargains, however, is just as 
important-if not more so-as protecting the defendant who contests guilt at 
trial. In the plea bargaining context, there is no neutral arbiter to ensure that 
the government negotiates fairly, no array of trial rights to protect the 
innocent, and no showing of the government's cards to assure us that the 
conviction was a "sure-thing" anyway.232 Indeed, Brady's importance in the 
plea bargaining context i.s clear in part just because so many cases are 
resolved there.233 After all, the. accuracy that our formal criminal justice 
system endeavors to secure is of limited practical import-ninety percent of 
the time, the plea bargaining context is the only context that matters.234 
231. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 493. 
232. See Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1581 (recognizing the lack of constitutional and statutory 
protections surrounding a defendant's decision to bargain or stand trial); Sheppard, supra note 43, at 
201 (noting the unstructured and unsupervised nature of plea bargaining). 
233. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. This point is especially strong given the incentives 
prosecutors have to funnel weak cases-those we most expect to have Brady information-to the plea 
bargaining context. See supra text accompanying note 147. 
234. See supra note 2. 
